THE SHELLOW COLLECTION
Jury Instructions By James M. Shellow of Wisconsin
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Collection Table of Contents
Basic Elements Of A Criminal Allegation: Knowledge
1. Definition of
Knowledge
2. Mere Knowledge
Insufficient
3. Knowledge And Presence
Insufficient
4. Each Defendant Must
Have Knowledge
5. Knowledge: Burden Of
Proof
6. Corporate Crimes:
Guilty Knowledge Cannot Be Imputed To Employers
When Knowledge Acquired By
Employees Acting Outside The Scope
Of Their Employment
THE SHELLOW COLLECTION
Jury Instructions By James M. Shellow of Wisconsin
1. Definition Of Knowledge
ALERT: Carefully review the Caveats and Disclaimers before using these materials.
SAMPLE INSTRUCTION # 1:
When the word "knowingly" is used in these instructions, it means that the defendant realized what he or she was doing and was aware of the nature of his or her conduct, and did not act through ignorance, mistake, or accident. [An individual does not have knowledge of a fact merely because his or her employer had knowledge of that fact.]
AUTHORITIES:
Seventh Circuit Pattern Instructions 4.06 ["Knowingly"--Definition] [formerly 6.04 (modified)].
SAMPLE INSTRUCTION # 2:
When the word "knowingly" is used in these instructions, it means that the defendant realized what (he/she) was doing and was aware of the nature of (his/her) conduct, and did not act through ignorance, mistake or accident.
AUTHORITY:
Federal Criminal Jury Instructions of the Seventh Circuit,4.06 ["Knowingly"--Definition] [formerly 6.04 (modified)].
SAMPLE INSTRUCTION # 3:
An act is done knowingly if it is done voluntarily and intentionally and not by reason of mistake or accident or other innocent reason.
CASES WHERE THE ABOVE INSTRUCTION WAS GIVEN:
United States v. Brown, No. CR83-310(C)M (W.D. Wash. 1983).
RELATED NCJIC MATERIALS:
See NCJIC Chapter 47: Knowledge.
THE SHELLOW COLLECTION
Jury Instructions By James M. Shellow of Wisconsin
2. Mere Knowledge Insufficient
ALERT: Carefully review the Caveats and Disclaimers before using these materials.
SAMPLE INSTRUCTION # 1:
Knowledge that another in (his/her) company is going to commit a criminal act does not make a defendant liable for the commission of that act.
AUTHORITIES:
Snyder v. United States, 448 F.2d 716, 718 (8th Cir. 1971); Ramirez v. United States, 363 F.2d 33, 34 (9th Cir. 1966); United States v. Garguilo, 310 F.2d 249, 253 (2d Cir. 1962).
CASES WHERE THE ABOVE INSTRUCTION WAS GIVEN:
United States v. Stillman, No. 80-133-Erie (W.D. Pa. 1981); United States v. Linton, No. CR-R-80-24-ECR (D.C. Nev. 1981); United States v. Robinson, No. 78-CR-106 (E.D. Wis. 1979); United States v. Kramer, No. 81-CR-106 (E.D. Wis. 1982).
SAMPLE INSTRUCTION # 2:
Knowledge that another is going to commit a criminal act does not make a person liable for the commission of that act.
AUTHORITIES:
Snyder v. United States, 448 F.2d 716, 718 (8th Cir. 1971); Ramirez v. United States, 363 F.2d 33, 34 (9th Cir. 1966); United States v. Garguilo, 310 F.2d 249, 253 (2d Cir. 1962).
CASES WHERE THE ABOVE INSTRUCTION WAS GIVEN:
United States v. Blas, No. 89-CR-232 (E.D. Wis. 1990).
RELATED SHELLOW MATERIALS:
See also THE SHELLOW COLLECTION: Elements: Criminal Intent – Specific Intent: Mere Knowledge And Association Insufficient.
RELATED NCJIC MATERIALS:
See NCJIC Chapter 47: Knowledge.
See also NCJIC 64.1 [Accomplice Liability: Intent And Knowledge Elements].
THE SHELLOW COLLECTION
Jury Instructions By James M. Shellow of Wisconsin
3. Knowledge And Presence Insufficient
ALERT: Carefully review the Caveats and Disclaimers before using these materials.
SAMPLE INSTRUCTION:
Knowledge that another person is going to commit a criminal act, even coupled with presence at the scene, alone does not make a defendant liable for the commission of that act.
AUTHORITIES:
Snyder v. United States, 448 F.2d 716, 718 (8th Cir. 1971); Ramirez v. United States, 363 F.2d 33, 34 (9th Cir. 1966); United States v. Garguilo, 310 F.2d 249, 253 (2d Cir. 1962).
CASES WHERE THE ABOVE INSTRUCTION WAS GIVEN:
United States v. Blas, No. 89-CR-232 (E.D. Wis. 1990) (Curran, J.).
RELATED NCJIC MATERIALS:
See NCJIC Chapter 47: Knowledge.
See also NCJIC 64.1 [Accomplice Liability: Intent And Knowledge Elements].
See also NCJIC 64.2 [Accomplice Liability: Mere Presence Insufficient].
THE SHELLOW COLLECTION
Jury Instructions By James M. Shellow of Wisconsin
4. Each Defendant Must Have Knowledge
ALERT: Carefully review the Caveats and Disclaimers before using these materials.
SAMPLE INSTRUCTION:
No defendant in this case is responsible for what any other defendant may have known. He or she is responsible only for what the government has proven he or she knew. The required knowledge must be actual and individual; it may not be implied in one defendant because another defendant had it. In other words, just because one defendant may have had knowledge of a fact does not mean that any other defendant also had that knowledge.
AUTHORITY:
United States v. Interstate Engineering Corp., 288 F. Supp. 402, 412 (D.N.H. 1967) (Wyzanski, C.J.).
RELATED NCJIC MATERIALS:
See NCJIC Chapter 47: Knowledge.
THE SHELLOW COLLECTION
Jury Instructions By James M. Shellow of Wisconsin
5. Knowledge: Burden Of Proof
ALERT: Carefully review the Caveats and Disclaimers before using these materials.
SAMPLE INSTRUCTION:
In these instructions, when I say that the government must prove that the defendant knew something, this means that the government must really prove two facts. The first is that the fact supposedly known by the defendant did exist. That is, someone cannot be said to know a fact unless that fact has been established by proof. Secondly, the government must prove that the defendant had actual and personal knowledge that this fact existed. It is not sufficient if he just believed it to be true or if he had heard from others that it was true. You must be satisfied from the evidence that he knew that it was true. In this way does knowledge differ from belief. A person may believe that something is a fact even though it does not exist as a fact and is not true. However, one cannot know a fact unless that fact exists.
RELATED NCJIC MATERIALS:
See NCJIC Chapter 47: Knowledge.
See also generally NCJIC 270.2 [Presumption Of Innocence - Prosecution Burden To Prove Guilt].
THE SHELLOW COLLECTION
Jury Instructions By James M. Shellow of Wisconsin
6. Corporate Crimes: Guilty Knowledge Cannot Be Imputed To Employers When Knowledge Acquired By Employees Acting Outside The Scope Of Their Employment
ALERT: Carefully review the Caveats and Disclaimers before using these materials.
SAMPLE INSTRUCTION:
The offense charged in this indictment requires guilty knowledge or specific intent as an element of the offense. In such a prosecution, a corporation cannot be charged with guilty knowledge acquired by employees acting outside the scope of their employment. An employee is not within the scope of (his/her) employment unless (his/her) acts are motivated by a purpose to benefit (his/her) employer or to further (his/her) employer's business.
AUTHORITY:
Standard Oil Company of Texas v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 125 (5th Cir. 1962).
RELATED SHELLOW MATERIALS:
See also THE SHELLOW COLLECTION: Corporate Liability.
See also THE SHELLOW COLLECTION: Corporate Conspiracy.
RELATED NCJIC MATERIALS:
See NCJIC Chapter 47: Knowledge.
See generally NCJIC Chapter 69: Corporate Liability.