THE SHELLOW COLLECTION
Jury Instructions By James M. Shellow of Wisconsin
Go to Shellow Collection Table of Contents

Corporate Conspiracy

    1.    Corporation Cannot Conspire With Itself
    2.    Corporation And Its Employee/Agent Do Not Conspire
    3.    Corporate Conspiracy: Attributable Conduct And Special Relationships
    4.    Specific Intent And Employer-Employee Relationships
    5.    Conspiracy: Corporations vs. Natural Persons
    6.    Corporation Cannot Conspire With Its Own Agents
    7.    Immutability Of Conduct Re: Corporate Defendants
    8.    Corporate Conspiracy: Mere Employment Insufficient
    9.    Employees Not Charged In Scheme Or Conspiracy
    10.  Corporate Conspiracy: Admissions By Agent


THE SHELLOW COLLECTION
Jury Instructions By James M. Shellow of Wisconsin

1.    Corporation Cannot Conspire With Itself

ALERT: Carefully review the Caveats and Disclaimers before using these materials.

SAMPLE INSTRUCTION:

    There is no conspiracy unless two or more separate parties combine and affirmatively agree together. In this case, you must find that there was no conspiracy unless the plaintiffs have established by evidence which is clear, convincing and satisfactory that [Corporation A] affirmatively joined and participated in an unlawful agreement with [Corporation B]. An agreement between two agents of the same corporation is not sufficient.

AUTHORITIES:

Elbe v. Wausau Hospital Center, 606 F. Supp. 1491, 1501-02 (W.D. Wis. 1985); Winslow v. Brown, 125 Wis. 2d 327, 331, 371 N.W.2d 417 (Ct. App.), rev. denied, 126 Wis. 2d 518, 378 N.W.2d 291 (1985).

RELATED SHELLOW MATERIALS:

See also THE SHELLOW COLLECTION: Conspiracy.

See also THE SHELLOW COLLECTION: Corporate Liability.

RELATED NCJIC MATERIALS:

See generally NCJIC Chapter 69: Corporate Liability.

See generally NCJIC Chapter 83: Conspiracy.

See also NCJIC 83.3 [Conspiracy: Defenses And Defense Theories].

See also NCJIC 83.2.8 [Conspiracy: Corporate Liability -- Requirement Of At Least Two Natural Persons].


THE SHELLOW COLLECTION
Jury Instructions By James M. Shellow of Wisconsin

2.    Corporation And Its Employee/Agent Do Not Conspire

ALERT: Carefully review the Caveats and Disclaimers before using these materials.

SAMPLE INSTRUCTION:

    A corporation and a single employee of that corporation cannot conspire with each other. In order for a corporation to become a member of a conspiracy, there must be two or more co-conspirators other than the corporation itself, at least one of whom is an agent of the corporation acting within the scope of his or her agency.

AUTHORITY:

United States v. Stevens, 909 F.2d 431 (11th Cir. 1990).

RELATED SHELLOW MATERIALS:

See also THE SHELLOW COLLECTION: Conspiracy.

See also THE SHELLOW COLLECTION: Corporate Liability.

RELATED NCJIC MATERIALS:

See generally NCJIC Chapter 69: Corporate Liability.

See generally NCJIC Chapter 83: Conspiracy.

See also NCJIC 83.3 [Conspiracy: Defenses And Defense Theories].

See also NCJIC 83.2.8 [Conspiracy: Corporate Liability -- Requirement Of At Least Two Natural Persons].


THE SHELLOW COLLECTION
Jury Instructions By James M. Shellow of Wisconsin

3.    Corporate Conspiracy: Attributable Conduct And Special Relationships

ALERT: Carefully review the Caveats and Disclaimers before using these materials.

SAMPLE INSTRUCTION:

    The acts and declarations of an agent or employee cannot be attributed, as those of a co-conspirator, to the principal or employer. Similarly, acts and declarations which have been imputed to a corporate principal cannot be attributed, as those of a co-conspirator, to its employees or agents. These rules apply even though the employee and employer or principal and agent are jointly indicted and charged with being members of the same conspiracy.

RELATED SHELLOW MATERIALS:

See also THE SHELLOW COLLECTION: Conspiracy.

See also THE SHELLOW COLLECTION: Corporate Liability.

RELATED NCJIC MATERIALS:

See generally NCJIC Chapter 69: Corporate Liability.

See generally NCJIC Chapter 83: Conspiracy.

See also NCJIC 83.3 [Conspiracy: Defenses And Defense Theories].

See also NCJIC 83.2.8 [Conspiracy: Corporate Liability -- Requirement Of At Least Two Natural Persons].


THE SHELLOW COLLECTION
Jury Instructions By James M. Shellow of Wisconsin

4.    Specific Intent And Employer-Employee Relationships

ALERT: Carefully review the Caveats and Disclaimers before using these materials.

SAMPLE INSTRUCTION:

    A specific criminal intent is an element of the crime of conspiracy charged in this indictment. Accordingly, an employer may be penalized for an employee's criminal act only if the agent acted within the scope of his employment, and not if the agent acted for some purpose other than that of serving his employer. The corporation does not acquire that knowledge or possess the requisite state of mind essential for criminal responsibility through the activities of unfaithful agents or employees whose conduct was undertaken to advance either their own interests or the interests of parties other than their corporate employer.

AUTHORITIES:

United States v. Ridglea State Bank, 357 F.2d 495, 498 (5th Cir. 1966), citing cases including Standard Oil Company of Texas v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 129 (5th Cir. 1962), and Restatement (2d), Agency §217(D), Comment (d) and §235 (1958).

RELATED SHELLOW MATERIALS:

See also THE SHELLOW COLLECTION: Conspiracy.

See also THE SHELLOW COLLECTION: Corporate Liability.

RELATED NCJIC MATERIALS:

See generally NCJIC Chapter 69: Corporate Liability.

See generally NCJIC Chapter 83: Conspiracy.

See also NCJIC 83.3 [Conspiracy: Defenses And Defense Theories].

See also NCJIC 83.2.8 [Conspiracy: Corporate Liability -- Requirement Of At Least Two Natural Persons].


THE SHELLOW COLLECTION
Jury Instructions By James M. Shellow of Wisconsin

5.    Conspiracy: Corporations vs. Natural Persons

ALERT: Carefully review the Caveats and Disclaimers before using these materials.

SAMPLE INSTRUCTION # 1:

    I have indicated to you that there are circumstances in which the knowledge of a corporate employee becomes the knowledge of the corporate principal. The converse is never true. Merely because a corporation is found to have knowledge by virtue of the fact that a corporate employee had knowledge does not permit the imputation of this knowledge to other corporate employees.

    Actual knowledge is required of all natural persons before any natural defendant can be found guilty of a conspiracy. There are many elements of the crime of conspiracy and each of these elements must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt as to any defendant for which the government desires a conviction.

    Perhaps the most complex of these elements is called specific intent. It is difficult to define; it is difficult to comprehend; but it is necessary for the jury to grasp its meaning and to apply the law.

    Perhaps the best discussion of the meaning of specific intent in the context of a conspiracy prosecution was that of Judge Learned Hand who said that it was perfectly proper to convict a person for running a red light even though he did not know that the light was red, but that a person could not be convicted of a conspiracy to run the red light without actual knowledge that the light was red. This analogy may be of some assistance and if it is I urge that you consider it. However, the question of specific intent must be faced in the context of the conspiracy charged in this indictment and analogies may not be of much help.

    The government has charged these defendants with a conspiracy to defraud . This is not a conspiracy to defraud . In order for the government to prove its case it is necessary that it prove that the defendants had the specific intent to enter into an agreement the purpose of which was to defraud the . If this was not the specific intent of these defendants, then, regardless of what other agreements they may have had, they must be acquitted of the charge.

SAMPLE INSTRUCTION # 2:

    I have indicated to you that there are circumstances in which the knowledge of a corporate employee becomes the knowledge of the corporate principal. However, merely because a corporation is found to have knowledge by virtue of the fact that a corporate employee had knowledge does not permit the imputation of this knowledge to other corporate employees.

    Actual knowledge is required of all natural persons before any natural defendant can be found guilty of a conspiracy. There are many elements of the crime of conspiracy and each of these elements must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt as to any defendant for which the government desires a conviction.

    Perhaps the most complex of these elements is called specific intent. It is difficult to define; it is difficult to comprehend; but it is necessary for the jury to grasp its meaning and to apply the law.

    Perhaps the best discussion of the meaning of specific intent in the context of a conspiracy prosecution was that of Judge Learned Hand who said that it was perfectly proper to convict a person for running a red light even though he did not know that the light was red, but that a person could not be convicted of a conspiracy to run the red light without actual knowledge that the light was red. This analogy may be of some assistance and if it is I urge that you consider it. However, the question of specific intent must be faced in the context of the conspiracy charged in this indictment and analogies may not be of much help.

    The government has charged these defendants with a conspiracy to defraud . This is not a conspiracy to defraud . In order for the government to prove its case it is necessary that it prove that the defendants had the specific intent to enter into an agreement the purpose of which was to defraud the . If this was not the specific intent of these defendants, then, regardless of what other agreements they may have had, they must be acquitted of the charge.

RELATED SHELLOW MATERIALS:

See also THE SHELLOW COLLECTION: Conspiracy.

See also THE SHELLOW COLLECTION: Corporate Liability.

RELATED NCJIC MATERIALS:

See generally NCJIC Chapter 69: Corporate Liability.

See generally NCJIC Chapter 83: Conspiracy.

See also NCJIC 83.3 [Conspiracy: Defenses And Defense Theories].

See also NCJIC 83.2.8 [Conspiracy: Corporate Liability -- Requirement Of At Least Two Natural Persons].


THE SHELLOW COLLECTION
Jury Instructions By James M. Shellow of Wisconsin

6.    Corporation Cannot Conspire With Its Own Agents

ALERT: Carefully review the Caveats and Disclaimers before using these materials.

SAMPLE INSTRUCTION:

    It is basic that you must have at least two persons or entities to have a conspiracy. A corporation cannot conspire with itself, any more than a private individual can, and it is the general rule that the acts of the agent are the acts of the corporation. Accordingly, a corporation cannot conspire with its own employees or its own agents.

AUTHORITY:

Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911, 914-15 (5th Cir. 1952).

RELATED SHELLOW MATERIALS:

See also THE SHELLOW COLLECTION: Conspiracy.

See also THE SHELLOW COLLECTION: Corporate Liability.

RELATED NCJIC MATERIALS:

See generally NCJIC Chapter 69: Corporate Liability.

See generally NCJIC Chapter 83: Conspiracy.

See also NCJIC 83.3 [Conspiracy: Defenses And Defense Theories].

See also NCJIC 83.2.8 [Conspiracy: Corporate Liability -- Requirement Of At Least Two Natural Persons].


THE SHELLOW COLLECTION
Jury Instructions By James M. Shellow of Wisconsin

7.    Immutability Of Conduct Re: Corporate Defendants

ALERT: Carefully review the Caveats and Disclaimers before using these materials.

SAMPLE INSTRUCTION:

    I have attempted to discuss with you the circumstances in which the acts and declarations of one member of a conspiracy may be imputed, under certain circumstances, to other defendants who have been found to be members of the same conspiracy. The problem, of imputing such acts and declarations, becomes substantially more complex when the question of corporate defendants is involved. Thus, although a corporation may be responsible for the acts and declarations of persons proven to be its agents who are acting within the scope of their actual authority, a corporation cannot be responsible for the acts and declarations which have been imputed to a different corporation.

    As an example of this problem and as illustrative only, if the evidence were to show that a corporate agent acting within the scope of his actual authority made a statement in furtherance of a conspiracy and that statement was imputed to a corporate defendant, the statement could not be further attributed to a second corporate defendant even though it were alleged that both corporate defendants were members of the same conspiracy.

    Another way of expressing this rule of law is that while individual defendants who are found to be members of the same conspiracy act as each others agents for the purposes of attributing their acts and declarations to each other, corporate defendants who are found to be members of the same conspiracy do not have the acts which are attributed to them re-attributed to other corporate defendants.

RELATED SHELLOW MATERIALS:

See also THE SHELLOW COLLECTION: Conspiracy.

See also THE SHELLOW COLLECTION: Corporate Liability.

RELATED NCJIC MATERIALS:

See generally NCJIC Chapter 69: Corporate Liability.

See generally NCJIC Chapter 83: Conspiracy.

See also NCJIC 83.3 [Conspiracy: Defenses And Defense Theories].

See also NCJIC 83.2.8 [Conspiracy: Corporate Liability -- Requirement Of At Least Two Natural Persons].


THE SHELLOW COLLECTION
Jury Instructions By James M. Shellow of Wisconsin

8.    Corporate Conspiracy: Mere Employment Insufficient

ALERT: Carefully review the Caveats and Disclaimers before using these materials.

SAMPLE INSTRUCTION:

    A conspiracy is a group of people bound together by a common agreement to achieve an unlawful purpose. Conspirators need not have the same stake in the venture. Under some circumstances an employee may conspire with his employer, but the fact of employment standing alone does not make the employee a conspirator with his employer.

RELATED SHELLOW MATERIALS:

See also THE SHELLOW COLLECTION: Conspiracy.

See also THE SHELLOW COLLECTION: Corporate Liability.

RELATED NCJIC MATERIALS:

See generally NCJIC Chapter 69: Corporate Liability.

See generally NCJIC Chapter 83: Conspiracy.

See also NCJIC 83.3 [Conspiracy: Defenses And Defense Theories].

See also NCJIC 83.2.8 [Conspiracy: Corporate Liability -- Requirement Of At Least Two Natural Persons].


THE SHELLOW COLLECTION
Jury Instructions By James M. Shellow of Wisconsin

9.    Employees Not Charged In Scheme Or Conspiracy

ALERT: Carefully review the Caveats and Disclaimers before using these materials.

SAMPLE INSTRUCTION:

    The government does not contend that any employee of ________ [name of business] was a participant in the alleged scheme and conspiracy with which the defendants are charged. Neither does the government contend that any employee of [said business] acted outside the scope of his or her employment and authority. Accordingly, if you find that any employee of ________ [name of business] knew the relevant facts, and acquiesced in or approved the actions alleged in the indictment, that constitutes the knowledge and acquiescence or approval of that person's employer.

AUTHORITIES:

St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 968 F.2d 695, 700-01 (8th Cir. 1992), affirming, 765 F. Supp. 538, 543-47 (D. Minn. 1991); First Nat. Bank of Cicero v. Lewco Securities Corp., 860 F.2d 1407, 1417-18 (7th Cir. 1988); Restatement (Second) of Agency §§9(3), 268(1), 272, 274, 275 (1958); see also State v. Mullein, 225 N.W.2d 305, 307-08 (Iowa 1975) [depositor could not be convicted for cashing an overdraft check on his own account at another office of the same bank; knowledge of bank officer that account was overdrawn is imputed to entire bank, so bank not deceived].

RELATED SHELLOW MATERIALS:

See also THE SHELLOW COLLECTION: Conspiracy.

See also THE SHELLOW COLLECTION: Corporate Liability.

RELATED NCJIC MATERIALS:

See generally NCJIC Chapter 69: Corporate Liability.

See generally NCJIC Chapter 83: Conspiracy.

See also NCJIC 83.3 [Conspiracy: Defenses And Defense Theories].

See also NCJIC 83.2.8 [Conspiracy: Corporate Liability -- Requirement Of At Least Two Natural Persons].


THE SHELLOW COLLECTION
Jury Instructions By James M. Shellow of Wisconsin

10.    Corporate Conspiracy: Admissions By Agent

ALERT: Carefully review the Caveats and Disclaimers before using these materials.

SAMPLE INSTRUCTION # 1:

    In this trial the government has offered the statements of a number of persons. Perhaps one of the most complex matters you will have to consider is the extent to which the statement of one person becomes, as a matter of law, the statement of another. I have explained that this situation can arise in prosecutions in which the government has proven beyond a doubt that there is a conspiracy and that both the declaring and the person against whom the statement is sought to be admitted are found beyond a reasonable doubt to be members of that conspiracy. I shall now further discuss situations in which the statements of one person may be considered by a jury against another party:

    Where a party is a natural person, any statement made by him either publicly or secretly is his.

    Where the natural person has an agent who makes a statement to a third person, the statement is the principal's if the agent was authorized to make the statement or was authorized to make on the principal's behalf true statements concerning the subject matter.

    Where the agent makes a report to the principal or to another agent, and all that appears is that the principal had authorized the agent to make such a report, a statement in the report is not the principal's and is not an admission of the principal. Authority merely to report to a principal or to a fellow agent is not authority to commit the principal.

    However, if the principal expressly said, either before or after the agent spoke, that he vouched for the agent's statement or wanted action taken upon it, then it is his statement even though it was not made for communication to the outside world. The basis for regarding the statement as the principal's is that he has expressly authorized it to be used or has adopted it. Even if the principal does not expressly vouch for the agent's statement, if he acts or conducts his business in such a way as to show by implication that he adopted the statement, then such parts of the statement as he acted upon are his. And to that extent the statement is receivable against the principal as an adoptive admission.

    A corporation may make its statement by a vote of the shareholders, or on most matters by a vote of the directors. And whether these be open or secret votes, they are admissions of the corporation. Where officers and employees of a corporation speak to the outside world, the corporate principal like the individual principal is held accountable for the agent's statement if he was authorized to make the statement or was authorized to make, on the principal's behalf, true statements concerning the subject matter. However, where these agents report to other corporate agents, the mere fact that the corporation gave the agents authority to make such internal reports does not make statements in those reports the statements of the corporation. If on the other hand shareholders or directors authorize or adopt the internal statement of the agent as the statement of the corporation, then they are statements of the corporate principal.

AUTHORITY:

United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corporation, 89 F.Supp. 349, 352-53 (D. Mass. 1950).

CASES WHERE THE ABOVE INSTRUCTION WAS GIVEN:

United States v. Linton, No. CR-R-80-24-ECR (D. Nev. 1981)

SAMPLE INSTRUCTION # 2:

    In this trial the government has offered the statements of a number of persons. Perhaps one of the most complex matters you will have to consider is the extent to which the statement of one person becomes, as a matter of law, the statement of another. I have explained that this situation can arise in prosecutions in which the government has proven beyond a doubt that there is a conspiracy and that both the declaring and the person against whom the statement is sought to be admitted are both found beyond a reasonable doubt to be a member of that conspiracy. I shall now further discuss situations in which the statements of a party may be considered by a jury:

    Where a party is a natural person, any statement made by him either publicly or secretly is his.

    Where the natural person has an agent who makes a statement to a third person, the statement is the principal's if the agent was authorized to make the statement or was authorized to make on the principal's behalf true statements concerning the subject matter.

    Where the agent makes a report to the principal or to another agent, and all that appears is that the principal had authorized the agent to make such a report, a statement in the report is not the principal's and is not an extra-judicial admission of the principal. Authority merely to report to a principal or a fellow agent is not authority to commit the principal.

    However, if the principal expressly said, either before or after the agent spoke, that he vouched for the agent's statement or wanted action taken upon it, then it is his statement even though it was not made for communication to the outside world. The basis for regarding the statement as the principal's is that he has expressly authorized it to be used or has adopted it. Even if the principal does not expressly vouch for the agent's statement, if he acts or conducts his business in such a way as to show by implication that he adopted the statement, then such parts of the statement as he acted upon are his. And to that extent the statement is receivable against the principal as an adoptive admission.

    A corporation may make its statement by a vote of the shareholders, or on most matters by a vote of the directors. And whether these be open or secret votes, they are admissions of the corporation. Where officers and employees of a corporation speak to the outside world, the corporate principal like the individual principal is held accountable for the agent's statement if he was authorized to make the statement or was authorized to make on the principal's behalf, true statements concerning the subject matter. However, where these agents report to other corporate agents, the mere fact that the corporation gave the agents authority to make such intra-mural reports does not make statements in those reports the statements of the corporation. However, where shareholders or directors authorize or adopt the intra-company statement of the agent as the statement of the corporation, then they are statements of the corporate principal.

AUTHORITIES:

United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corporation, 89 F. Supp. 349, 352-53 (D. Mass. 1950).

CASES WHERE THE ABOVE INSTRUCTION WAS GIVEN:

United States v. Linton, No. CR-R-80-24-ECR (D.C. Nev. 1981).

RELATED SHELLOW MATERIALS:

See also THE SHELLOW COLLECTION: Conspiracy.

See also THE SHELLOW COLLECTION: Corporate Liability.

RELATED NCJIC MATERIALS:

See generally NCJIC Chapter 69: Corporate Liability.

See generally NCJIC Chapter 83: Conspiracy.

See also NCJIC 83.3 [Conspiracy: Defenses And Defense Theories].

See also NCJIC 83.2.8 [Conspiracy: Corporate Liability -- Requirement Of At Least Two Natural Persons].