Opinion Bank # O-145
(Re: FORECITE National™ 252.7.6 [Robbery/Theft: Good Faith Belief In Consent].)CAVEAT: The file below was not prepared by FORECITE National™ . FORECITE National™ has not made any attempt to review or edit this material and is not responsible for its content or format. FORECITE National™ cannot guarantee the information is complete, accurate or up-to-date. You are advised to conduct your own independent, comprehensive research on all issues addressed in the material below
[No. H008472. Sixth Dist. Aug. 7, 1992]
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
ERVINE JAMES WILLIAMS,
Defendant and Appellant.
_______________________________________/
SUMMARY
Defendant, a parolee, was arrested pursuant to a n outstanding warrant after police stopped the rental vehicle he was driving for speeding. Subsequent investigation revealed that the rental car company had not authorized defendant's use of the vehicle. Defendant was charged with violating Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a) (unlawful driving or taking of vehicle), and Pen. Code, § 496 (receiving stolen property). During trial, the prosecutor attempted to impeach defendant with the fact that he had remained silent after he was advised of his constitutional rights. The trial court also refused to give a pinpoint instruction requested by defendant linking his mistake of fact defense to the element of specific intent. Defendant was convicted of both offenses. (Superior Court of Santa Clara County, No. 139958, Hugh F. Mullin III, Judge.)
The Court of Appeal reversed. The court held that the use for impeachment purposes of a defendant's silence after receiving constitutional warnings violates due process. The court also held that the prosecutor's substantial use of defendant's silence, in questioning and argument, constituted reversible error. Finally, the court held that the trial court erred in failing to give defendant's requested instruction, since it was a correct statement of law and pinpointed the defense offered at trial. (Opinion by Capaccioli, Acting P. J., with Premo and Elia, JJ., concurring.)
EXCERPT
C. Mistake of Fact Instruction
Defendant asserts that the trial court erred when it refused to instruct the jury as follows: "If one takes personal property of another with the good faith belief that he has permission to take the property, he is not guilty of theft. This is the case even if such good faith belief is unreasonable. The prosecutor must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not so believe for you to convict the defendant of theft." Instead the court gave CALJIC No. 4.35: "An act committed in ignorance or by reason of a mistake of fact which disproves any criminal intent is not a crime. [¶] Thus a person is not guilty of [a] crime if he commits an act under an honest belief in the existence of certain facts and circumstances which, if true, would make such act lawful."
"A criminal defendant is entitled, on request, to a[n] instruction 'pinpointing' the theory of his defense." (People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 570 [280 Cal.Rptr. 631, 809 P.2d 290].) Since the proffered instruction was a correct statement of the law and correctly pinpointed the defense offered at trial, the trial court was obligated to so instruct on defendant's request. We do not agree with the Attorney General that the pattern jury instruction was "sufficient." The requested instruction directly tied the mistake of fact defense to the critical specific intent element. This was of major importance to defendant's theory of the case. Consequently, the court erred when it refused to give this instruction.
CONCLUSION
The judgment is reversed.
Premo, J., and Elia, J., concurred.