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VOLUME 17 - CHAPTER 301
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301.3 Death Penalty: Aggravation

    301.3.1 State May Identify Aggravating Factors
    301.3.2 Death Penalty: Jury Consideration Of Nonstatutory Aggravation
    301.3.3 Improper For The Jury To Consider Invalid Aggravating Factors For Death Eligibility
    301.3.4 Death Penalty: Improper For The Jury To Consider Invalid Aggravating Factors For Sentencing

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VOLUME 17 - CHAPTER 301

PRACTICE NOTE: Subject to the constitutional requirement that a death penalty statute must nonarbitrarily define the class of death-eligible murderers, states are free to determine what aggravating factors best serve this purpose. Unlike mitigating factors, the constitution does not require a state to treat any particular factor as an aggravator. Moreover, in Zant v. Stephens (1983) 462 US 862 [103 SCt 2733; 77 LEd2d 235] the Court stated that a statute identifying aggravating circumstances need not also provide standards to govern the jury in weighing the significance of those circumstances. (Id. at 880.) Finally, in Blystone v. Pennsylvania (1990) 494 US 299, 306-07 [110 SCt 1078; 108 LEd2d 255], the Court stated that the 8th Amendment does not require that the jury evaluate the weight of a given aggravating circumstance to determine if the severity of the aggravating circumstance in each particular case justifies the death sentence.

See Capital Punishment Handbook [4.4.3a. Role Of Aggravating And Mitigating Circumstances: General Principles And Authorities].

See also Capital Punishment Handbook [4.5.2a. Role Of Aggravating And Mitigating Circumstances: General Principles And Authorities].

See also Capital Punishment Handbook [4.7a. Aggravating Circumstances: General Principles And Authorities].

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VOLUME 17 - CHAPTER 301

PRACTICE NOTE: According to Zant v. Stephens (1983) 462 US 862 [103 SCt 2733; 77 LEd2d 235] and Barclay v. Florida (1983) 463 US 939 [105 SCt 3418; 77 LEd 2d 1134], a state may choose to make its statutory aggravating circumstances exclusive or it may permit the consideration of "nonstatutory" aggravating factors not listed in the statute. Any nonstatutory aggravating circumstances considered must be relevant to either the defendant’s character or the circumstances of the crime. (Barclay, 463 US at 966–67.)

See Capital Punishment Handbook [4.4.3a. Role Of Aggravating And Mitigating Circumstances: General Principles And Authorities].

See also Capital Punishment Handbook [4.5.2a. Role Of Aggravating And Mitigating Circumstances: General Principles And Authorities].

See also Capital Punishment Handbook [4.7a. Aggravating Circumstances: General Principles And Authorities].

See also Capital Punishment Handbook [4.7.1a. Statutory And Nonstatutory Aggravating Circumstances: General Principles And Authorities].

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VOLUME 17 - CHAPTER 301

PRACTICE NOTE: See Capital Punishment Handbook [4.9.1.2 One Invalid/Weak Aggravating Circumstance].

    See also NCJIC 303.17.3 [Review Of Invalid Or Insufficient Aggravating Factors].

See Capital Punishment Handbook [4.4.3a. Role Of Aggravating And Mitigating Circumstances: General Principles And Authorities].

See also Capital Punishment Handbook [4.5.2a. Role Of Aggravating And Mitigating Circumstances: General Principles And Authorities].

See also Capital Punishment Handbook [4.7a. Aggravating Circumstances: General Principles And Authorities].

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VOLUME 17 - CHAPTER 301

    301.3.4    Death Penalty: Improper For The Jury To Consider Invalid Aggravating Factors For Sentencing

PRACTICE NOTE: Weighing of invalid aggravating circumstances violates the 8th and 14th Amendments. (Espinosa v. Florida (1992) 505 US 1079, 1080-83 [112 SCt 2926; 120 LEd2d 854]; Clemons v. Mississippi (1990) 494 US 738, 752 [110 SCt 1441; 108 LEd2d 725].) The 8th and 14th Amendments requires "close appellate scrutiny of the import and effect of invalid aggravating factors ...." (Stringer v. Black (1992) 503 US 222, 230 [112 SCt 1130; 117 LEd2d 367].) "Employing an invalid aggravating factor in the weighing process 'creates the possibility...of randomness,' [citation] by placing a 'thumb [on] death's side of the scale' [citation] thus 'creat[ing] the risk [of] treat[ing] the defendant as more deserving of the death penalty' [citation]." (Sochor v. Florida (1992) 504 US 527, 532 [112 SCt 2114; 119 LEd2d 326]; 8th & 14th Amendments.)

    An aggravating factor is invalid under the 8th and 14th Amendments if its description is so vague as to leave the sentencer without sufficient guidance for determining the presence or absence of the factor. (Stringer v. Black (1992) 503 US 222, 228 [112 SCt 1130; 117 LEd2d 367, 377]; Shell v. Mississippi (1990) 498 US 1 [111 SCt 313; 112 LEd2d 1]; Maynard v. Cartwright (1988) 486 US 356, 363 [108 SCt 1853; 100 LEd2d 372]; Godfrey v. Georgia (1980) 446 US 420, 428 [100 SCt 1759; 64 LEd2d 398].) "[I]n the final analysis 'the constitutional prohibition on arbitrary and capricious capital sentencing determinations is not violated by a capital sentencing "scheme that permits the jury to exercise unbridled discretion in determining whether the death penalty should be imposed after it has found that the defendant is a member of the class made eligible for that penalty by statute."' [Citations.]" (People v. Bolin (CA 1998) 18 C4th 297, 342 [75 CR2d 412]; see also Buchanan v. Angelone (1998) 522 US 269, 276-77 [118 SCt 757; 139 LEd2d 702].)

    In Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 US 967 [114 SCt 2630; 129 LEd2d 750] the Supreme Court stated that its review of sentencing eligibility factors in the context of jury instructions is deferential. An instruction will not be ruled unconstitutional for vagueness if it has some "common sense core of meaning... that criminal juries should be capable of understanding." (Id. at 973–974.) In addition, the Court stated that jury instructions at capital sentencing need not be only in the form of specific propositional questions. An instruction may direct the jury to consider a crime’s "facts and circumstances." (Id. at 978.)

See Capital Punishment Handbook [4.4.3a. Role Of Aggravating And Mitigating Circumstances: General Principles And Authorities].

See also Capital Punishment Handbook [4.5.2a. Role Of Aggravating And Mitigating Circumstances: General Principles And Authorities].

See also Capital Punishment Handbook [4.7a. Aggravating Circumstances: General Principles And Authorities].