THE NATIONAL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTION COMPENDIUM
Instructions And Issues Omitted By The Pattern Instructions
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 VOLUME 16 - CHAPTER 300
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300.11 Jury Consideration Of Irrelevant Evidence

    300.11.1 Constitutional Claims: Instruction Allowing Jury To Consider Irrelevant Evidence Violates The Federal Constitution

THE NATIONAL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTION COMPENDIUM
Instructions And Issues Omitted By The Pattern Instructions
Copyright & Publication Information

 VOLUME 16 - CHAPTER 300

PRACTICE NOTE: Introduction of evidence of the defendant's bad character may be reversible error. (See e.g., Aucoin v. State (AL 1989) 548 So2d 1053, 1059 and Blakeney v. State (TX 1995) 911 SW2d 508, 516-17.) To be consistent with due process, evidence of other crimes must be rationally connected with the crime charged. (State v. Hawk (TN 1985) 688 SW2d 467, 474.)

    McKinney v. Rees (9th Cir. 1993) 993 F2d 1378, 1380-1382, held that admission of emotionally charged character evidence to show propensity which is irrelevant to any issues in the trial violates the due process clause of the federal constitution (14th Amendment) and provides the basis for a grant of relief on federal habeas. (See also Henry v. Estelle VACATED 52 F3d 809 (9th Cir. 1993) 993 F2d 1423, 1427-28 [evidence of remote uncharged conduct of child molest by defendant violates due process].)

    In People v. Garceau (CA 1993) 6 C4th 140 [24 CR2d 664], the majority opinion assumed, without deciding, that an instruction which improperly allowed the jury to utilize other-crimes evidence to show criminal propensity violated federal due process principles. (Garceau, 6 C4th at 185-87.) The concurring opinion of Justice Mosk, without reference to McKinney or Henry, concluded that the federal constitution was violated by the instruction because it lightened the state's burden. (Garceau, 6 C4th at 209-10.) On the other hand, Justice Kennard, in her concurring opinion (which also did not discuss McKinney or Henry) concluded that the instruction did not violate the federal constitution because the error did not influence the jury's understanding of either the elements of the charged offenses or the prosecution's burden of proof. (Garceau, 6 C4th at 212.) Nor did Justice Kennard believe that the propensity evidence violated the federal constitution's implied proscription (assuming there is one) against jury consideration of irrelevant evidence because the propensity evidence was relevant to guilt. (Ibid.)

    See also NCJIC 24.3.2.1 [Jury Must Not Consider Counsel’s Arguments On The Admissibility Of Evidence].

    See also NCJIC 24.3.2.2 [Arguments Are Not Evidence But Should Be Considered].

    See also NCJIC 26.10.1 [Jury Must Not Consider Evidence Admitted Solely Against Some Defendants And Not Others].

    See also NCJIC 279.1 [Jury Must Not Consider Penalty, Punishment Or Sentence].

    See also NCJIC 279.2 [Jury Not To Consider Penalty: Instruction May Increase The Risk That Penalty Will Be Considered].

    See also NCJIC 279.4 [Jury Not To Consider Penalty: Modification When Witness Testifies Pursuant To Bargain With Prosecution].

    See also NCJIC 279.5 [Jury Not To Consider Consequences Of Verdict: Strategic Consideration].

    See also NCJIC 301.3.3 [Improper For The Jury To Consider Invalid Aggravating Factors For Death Eligibility].