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VOLUME 7 - CHAPTER 92
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92.3 Voluntary Manslaughter
92.3.2 Voluntary Manslaughter: General Principles
92.3.2.1 Voluntary Manslaughter Defined
92.3.2.2 Right To Inconsistent Defense Theory Of Voluntary Manslaughter When Defendant Denied Killing Under Oath
92.3.2.3 Definition Of Intent To Kill
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VOLUME 7 - CHAPTER 92
92.3.2.1 Voluntary Manslaughter Defined
PRACTICE NOTE: Manslaughter is intentional homicide without malice aforethought. The most common reason for mitigation is severe provocation. As a result of severe provocation, an intentional killing which would otherwise be classified as murder is mitigated, though not excused. This is because the killing is deemed not to be the exclusive result of the defendant’s malice, but also of provocation from another source. A killer who is enraged as a result of provocation from another cannot properly be deemed to be killing out of malice, a requirement for murder. Mitigating an intentional killing without excusing it altogether serves a dual purpose: it assigns criminal liability in view of the immediate circumstances of the defendant’s actions while retaining an incentive for persons to control their impulses even in the face of severe provocation. (See Wharton’s Criminal Law, 15th Ed., 1994, §155, pp. 346 et seq.; Perkins and Boyce, Criminal Law, 3rd Ed., 1982, pp. 82-116.)
In order for a killing which would otherwise be murder to be reduced to manslaughter under the "rule of provocation" there are four requirements:
(1) There must have been adequate provocation.
(2) The killing must have been in the heat of passion.
(3) It must have been a sudden heat of passion -- that is, the killing must have followed the provocation before there had been a reasonable opportunity for the passion to cool.
(4) There must have been a causal connection between the provocation, the passion, and the fatal act. (See State v. Frederick (WA 1978) 579 P2d 390, 394.)
In short, voluntary manslaughter is a "catch-all" concept, covering all intentional homicides which are neither murder nor so innocent as to qualify for a complete defense, such as justification or excuse. (See Perkins and Boyce, Criminal Law, 3rd Ed., 1982, pp. 102-103.)
RELATED FEDERAL MODEL INSTRUCTIONS:
See
FORECITE National™ 92.3.1.2 [Federal Circuit Model Instructions And Notes].FORECITE National™
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VOLUME 7 - CHAPTER 92
92.3.2.2 Right To Inconsistent Defense Theory Of Voluntary Manslaughter When Defendant Denied Killing Under Oath
PRACTICE NOTE: Some cases suggest that when the defendant completely denies shooting the victim under oath, voluntary manslaughter instructions based on heat of passion or imperfect self defense are not required even on request. (See e.g., People v. Sinclair (CA 1998) 64 CA4th 1012, 1016 [75 CR2d 626]; State v. Hensen (MO 1977) 552 SW2d 378, 379 [self-defense and accident are inconsistent but both must be submitted if each is supported by the evidence unless defendant's personal testimony is relied upon to support both]; compare People v. Barton (CA 1995) 12 C4th 186, 200-01 [47 CR2d 569].) However, there are several problems with such a rule.
First, it is contrary to the well-settled principle that "a defendant is entitled to an instruction as to any recognized defense for which there exists evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in his favor. [Citation.]" (Mathews v. U.S. (1988) 485 US 58, 63 [108 SCt 883; 99 LEd2d 54]; see also
FORECITE National™ 250.2.5 [Right To Instruction On Inconsistent Defenses].)Second, this rule may violate the defendant's federal constitutional rights to testify and to present a defense. (E.g., Rock v. Arkansas (1987) 483 US 44, 56 [107 SCt 2704; 97 LEd2d 37]) and against self incrimination (E.g., Griffin v. California (1965) 380 US 609, 611 [85 SCt 1229; 14 LEd2d 106]; 5th and 14th Amendments.) This so because the defendant must choose between the right to testify and the right to advance a defense theory. (See
FORECITE National™ 300.1.12 [Due Process: Exercise Of One Constitutional Right Must Not Be Conditioned On Waiver Of Another].)NOTE: To the extent that such a rule is recognized it should be limited to situations where the sworn testimony of the accused "completely obviates any basis for finding a lesser included offense." (People v. Sinclair, 64 CA4th at 1021.)
RESEARCH NOTES:
See generally,
FORECITE National™ 305.13.1 [Manslaughter].RELATED FEDERAL MODEL INSTRUCTIONS:
See FORECITE National™ 92.3.1.2 [Federal Circuit Model Instructions And Notes].
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92.3.2.3 Definition Of Intent To Kill
See
FORECITE National™ 92.1.8 [Homicide: Definition Of Intent To Kill].