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89.4 Drunk Driving: Miscellaneous Defenses And Defense Theories

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RATIONALE: Where appropriate the defendant should be entitled to a defense theory instruction focusing on the issue of whether physical impairments contributed to the defendant's actions and mannerisms alleged by the prosecution to be evidence of driving under the influence.

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES: See generally, Palmes v. State (FL 1981) 397 So2d 648, 652.

FEDERALIZATION: To federalize this request, click here. [Constitutional Macro 4.1].

RESEARCH NOTES:

See generally, FORECITE National™ 305.4.10 [Drunk Driving].

    In considering whether the prosecution has proven all elements of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt, consider whether the actions and mannerisms of the defendant were caused by the influence of alcohol or by the defendant's physical condition or disability.  If, after considering all the evidence, including the defendant's physical condition and/or disabilities, you have a reasonable doubt whether the defendant drove while [under the influence of alcohol] [while intoxicated], you must vote to find the defendant not guilty.  

[Cf. Reiff, Drunk Driving and Related Vehicular Offenses 2d Ed. (Lexis, 1999) § 17-5(p), p. 393.]

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PRACTICE NOTE: Duress may be a defense to driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Refusal to so instruct has been held to be error. (See People v. Slack (CA 1989) 210 CA3d 937, 940 [258 CR 702]; see also People v. Pena (CA 1983) 149 CA3d Supp 14, 26-27 [208 CR 719]; State v. Knowles (ME 1985) 495 A2d 335, 339 [not inconsistent for defendant to deny operating vehicle while intoxicated and under license suspension and also to assert that operation of the vehicle under doctrine of duress was necessary to avoid imminent physical harm to himself or another].)

RESEARCH NOTES:

See generally, FORECITE National™ 305.4.10 [Drunk Driving].

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RATIONALE: Diabetes, low blood sugar, and hypoglycemia may contribute to erratic driving and, therefore, may be the basis for a defense theory instruction in a drunk driving case.

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES: Diabetes, low blood sugar and hypoglycemia may be defense theories to driving while intoxicated. (See e.g., People v. Smith (IL 1989) 538 NE2d 1268, 1273; see also State v. Gatien (OH 1997) 688 NE2d 54, 56; State v. Knuckles (WV 1996) 473 SE2d 131, 140.) However, a diabetic who knows that, in his or her particular medical situation, the ingestion of small amounts of alcohol can trigger symptoms of intoxication does not have a viable defense to a drunk driving charge. (Gatien, supra, at 56; see also McDonnell v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles (CA 1975) 45 CA3d 653, 661-62 [119 CR 804] [illness that is triggered by alcohol consumption and produces the symptoms of intoxication is not a defense to suspension of driver's license for refusal to take blood alcohol test]; Matter of Seat (IN 1992) 588 NE2d 1262, 1263 [a diabetic who chooses to drink in excess risks impairment of his driving ability and is as great a menace on the highways as if he had been drunk].)

FEDERALIZATION: To federalize this request, click here. [Constitutional Macro 2.3; 4.1].

RESEARCH NOTES:

See generally, FORECITE National™ 305.4.10 [Drunk Driving].

    The prosecution must prove that driving under the influence of alcohol and not diabetes caused [the defendant's driving to be impaired] [the accident]. If you have a reasonable doubt that being under the influence of alcohol caused [the defendant's impaired driving] [the accident], you must give the defendant the benefit of that doubt and find [him] [her] not guilty.

[Source: FORECITE National™.]

    If you find* that a contributing cause of the defendant’s accident was his inability to drive because of his sugar diabetes and the accident occurred as a result of his illness, and not because of his being under the influence of alcohol, then you must acquit the defendant.

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RESEARCH NOTES:

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RATIONALE: Because a psychiatric illness may manifest itself in the actions of the accused either before or after arrest, expert testimony and a defense theory instruction may be necessary to assure full jury consideration of this defense theory.

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES: White v. State (MD 2002) 790 A2d 754 held that the defendant may place before the jury expert testimony regarding a psychiatric profile that provides a psychiatric explanation for conduct appearing to result from alcohol impairment. Psychiatric disorders have long been recognized as being confused with alcohol impairment in the scientific community. (See A.W. Jones, "Medicolegal Alcohol Determinations, Blood Or Breath Alcohol Concentration?," 12 Forensic Sci. Rev. 23, 26 (2000).) Psychiatric testimony may be used in drunk driving cases where the defendant is not raising a defense of not criminally responsible. (See e.g., Gombar v. Dept. of Transportation (PA 1996) 678 A2d 843; Ventura v. State (TX 1990) 801 SW2d 225.) White, then, appears to represent something of a breakthrough.

FEDERALIZATION: To federalize this request, click here. [Constitutional Macro 4.1].

RESEARCH NOTE: See "DWI: I May Be Crazy But I Ain’t Drunk–The Psychiatric Defense To Drunk Driving," by Leonard R. Stamm, NACDL Champion, July 2002 (www.nacdl.org).

SAMPLE INSTRUCTION:

    It is [the] [a] defense theory that the conduct of the accused [before] [and] [after] the arrest was caused [in part,] by a psychiatric disorder. Consider this theory in light of all the evidence in deciding whether the prosecution has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused drove while intoxicated.

    After considering this theory, in light of all the evidence, any juror who has a reasonable doubt that the accused drove while intoxicated must give [him] [her] the benefit of that doubt and vote to acquit.

[Source: FORECITE National™.]