FORECITE National™
Instructions And Issues Omitted By The Pattern Instructions
Copyright & Publication Information

 VOLUME 5 - CHAPTER 45
Go to Volume 5 Table of Contents - Go to Chapter 45 Table of Contents

45.2 General And Specific Intent

    45.2.1 General And Specific Intent: Purposes, Distinctions And Criticism
    45.2.2 Determining Whether Crime Includes Specific Intent
    45.2.3 Specific Intent: Knowledge As An Element
    45.2.4 Willfulness And General Intent: Requirement Of Knowing Commission Of The Acts Making The Conduct Criminal

FORECITE National™
Instructions And Issues Omitted By The Pattern Instructions
Copyright & Publication Information

 VOLUME 5 - CHAPTER 45

PRACTICE NOTE: The terms "specific" and "general" intent have been notoriously difficult to define and apply. (See People v. Daniels (CA 1975) 14 C3d 857, 860 [122 CR 872]; see also People v. Hood (CA 1969) 1 C3d 444, 456 [82 CR 618].) The terms have been "employed in more than one sense, thereby causing confusion ...." (Daniels, 14 C3d at 860) and a number of text writers have recommended that they be abandoned altogether. (See texts cited in Hood and Daniels; see also Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses (West, 1984) (2000-01 Pocket Part) § 64(a) p. 44; 6TH CIRCUIT PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS - CRIMINAL 2.07 [Specific Intent] (1991); 7TH CIRCUIT FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS - CRIMINAL 4.08 [Specific Intent-General Intent] pg. 63, ¶ 1 Committee Comment (1999).) Use of "specific intent" and "general intent" in jury instructions was also criticized in Liparota v. U.S. (1985) 471 US 419, 433 n 16 [105 SCt 2084; 85 LEd2d 434]; see also People v. Thomas (CA 1994) UNPUBLISHED 26 CA4th 891 [31 CR2d 731] [so long as the intent required by the statute is conveyed to the jury, no further use of the exact term "specific intent" is required].)

    In fact, following the leadership of the Ninth Circuit's Committee on Model Jury Instructions, the Federal Judicial Center's PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS (1988) has abjured the terms "specific intent," "general intent," and "willfully." (See 9TH CIRCUIT MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS - CRIMINAL 5.6 [Knowingly-Defined] 5.7 [Deliberate Ignorance] (2000).)

    In People v. Whitfield (CA 1994) 7 C4th 437 [27 CR2d 858], the California Supreme Court seemed to endorse the view that the distinction between specific and general intent crimes is merely a device to permit evidence of intoxication to reduce the crime to a lower degree but not to permit it to result in total acquittal. Consistent with this view is the following quotation from Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (1978), p. 850, upon which the Whitfield court relied: "The distinction between specific and general intent facilitates a compromise between the rigors of denying the relevance of intoxication and allowing it to undercut all liability; in this respect the classification is functionally sound .... The distinction between general and specific intent is frequently litigated, for the simple reason that the courts tend to employ these terms as though they had a meaning beyond their function as devices for seeking a compromised verdict." (Whitfield, 7 C4th at 451, fn 5.)

    Nevertheless, the distinction between specific and general intent continues to be important in jurisdictions where specific intent may be subject to negation by intoxication and mental impairment while general intent may not. (See California Penal Code §§ 22 and 28.)

    In such jurisdictions "[t]he distinction between general intent and specific intent crimes is at bottom founded upon a policy decision regarding the availability of certain defenses." [Internal citations, quote marks and punctuation omitted.] (People v. Campbell (CA 1994) 23 CA4th 1488, 1493 [28 CR2d 716]; see also People v. Mendoza (CA 1998) 18 C4th 1114, 1127 [77 CR2d 428].)

See LaFave & Scott, Substantive Criminal Law (West, 1986) § 3.5(e).

See generally, FORECITE National™ 305.9.9 [Intent].

See 6th Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions - Criminal 2.07.

See also 8th Circuit Model Jury Instructions - Criminal 7.01.

See also 9th Circuit Model Jury Instructions - Criminal 5.4.

FORECITE National™
Instructions And Issues Omitted By The Pattern Instructions
Copyright & Publication Information

 VOLUME 5 - CHAPTER 45

PRACTICE NOTE: The process of determining whether a crime entails general or specific intent should start with an examination of the statutory language. General intent crimes proscribe particular acts. For such crimes, reference is not made to any intent to accomplish some further act or achieve some further consequence. (People v. Hood (CA 1969) 1 C3d 444, 456 [82 CR 618]; People v. Lopez (CA 1986) 188 CA3d 592, 598 [233 CR 207].) "[S]pecific intent is 'a conscious act' with the determination of mind to do an act." (Commonwealth v. Nickerson (MA 1983) 446 NE2d 68, 73.) "[I]t is the purpose or objective of the defendant at the time the crime was committed." (Commonwealth v. Blow (MA 1976) 348 NE2d 794, 798.) Where the definition includes the defendant's intent to accomplish a further act or achieve an additional consequence, the crime is one of specific intent. (People v. Mendoza (CA 1998) 18 C4th 1114, 1127 [77 CR2d 428]; see also Hood, 1 C3d at 456-57.)

See generally, FORECITE National™ 305.9.9 [Intent].

See 6th Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions - Criminal 2.07.

See also 8th Circuit Model Jury Instructions - Criminal 7.01.

See also 9th Circuit Model Jury Instructions - Criminal 5.4.

FORECITE National™
Instructions And Issues Omitted By The Pattern Instructions
Copyright & Publication Information

 VOLUME 5 - CHAPTER 45

PRACTICE NOTE: People v. Booth (CA 1996) 48 CA4th 1247, 1253-54 [56 CR2d 202] held that the concept of "knowledge" is included within the concept of specific intent. Therefore, a specific intent to commit a particular crime necessarily includes knowledge of the factual circumstances underlying a crime. In other words, "the word 'knowingly' merely implies the person know of facts which bring the act or omission within the scope of the statute." (Booth, 48 CA4th at 1253.)

See generally, FORECITE National™ 305.9.9 [Intent].

See 1st Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions - Criminal 2.14.

See 6th Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions - Criminal 2.07.

See also 8th Circuit Model Jury Instructions - Criminal 7.01.

See also 9th Circuit Model Jury Instructions - Criminal 5.4.

FORECITE National™
Instructions And Issues Omitted By The Pattern Instructions
Copyright & Publication Information

 VOLUME 5 - CHAPTER 45

RATIONALE: Even if defined only in terms of intent, general criminal intent should require knowledge of the facts which make the act criminal. Therefore, even though the jury is often instructed that the defendant need not know the act was criminal, the instructions should explain the requirement of knowledge of the facts which bring the act within the statute.

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES: "General intent is the intention to do the physical action which constitutes the act element of the crime."  (Cook and Hermann, Criminal Defense Checklist (West, 1999) pg. 50, § 1.03(12).)

    "[The prosecution is] required to prove that [defendant] had knowledge of all the facts making his conduct criminal under the provision involved...." (U.S. v. Baird (DC Cir. 1994) 29 F3d 647, 652.)

    See also FORECITE National™ 46.1 [Willfully Defined: Knowledge Element].

FEDERALIZATION: To federalize this request, click here. [Constitutional Macro 3.7; 4.1].

See generally, FORECITE National™ 305.9.9 [Intent].

See 1st Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions - Criminal 2.14.

See 6th Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions - Criminal 2.07.

See also 8th Circuit Model Jury Instructions - Criminal 7.01.

See also 9th Circuit Model Jury Instructions - Criminal 5.4.

    The term "knowingly" means that a defendant acted with awareness of [or belief in] the existence of conduct or circumstances constituting an offense.

[See generally U.S. v. Baird (DC Cir. 1994) 29 F3d 647; see also REVISED ARIZONA JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL), RAJI 1.056b [Knowingly Defined] p. 30, ¶ 1 (CLE State Bar of Arizona, 1996).]

    It must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the act with actual knowledge of the existence of the facts [, including the reasonable, natural and probable consequences of the act committed,] which bring the act within the provisions of the statute under which the defendant is charged.

    To willfully commit an act, a person must intentionally commit the act with actual knowledge of the facts [, including the reasonable, natural and probable consequences of the act,] which bring the act within the provisions of the statute under which [he] [she] is charged.

    If you have a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant committed the act with actual knowledge of the above facts, you must give the defendant the benefit of that doubt and find [him] [her] not guilty.

    [To willfully commit an act, a person must, with knowledge of what [he] [she] is doing, intentionally commit the act. This requires the prosecution to prove that the defendant committed the act with actual knowledge of the following: that the defendant __________ [insert requisite facts and/or consequences; e.g., that the arresting person was a police officer, that the substance was contraband and in the possession of the defendant, that the act was likely to result in a violent injury, etc.].]

    If you have a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant committed the act with actual knowledge of the above facts, you must give the defendant the benefit of that doubt and find [him] [her] not guilty.

    The knowledge element of the offense means knowledge of the facts which bring the act or omission within the provisions of the criminal statute.

[Cf. SOUTH DAKOTA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS - CRIMINAL, SDCL 1-11-2 [Knowledge, Knowingly-Definition] ¶1, sent. 1 (State Bar of South Dakota, 2000).]

    A person knows or acts knowingly or with knowledge when he or she is aware of a fact, circumstance or result which is described by law as being a crime.

[See U.S. v. Baird (DC Cir. 1994) 29 F3d 647; see also WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS - CRIMINAL, WPIC 10.02 [Knowledge-Knowingly-Definition] p. 150, ¶ 1 (West, 2nd ed. 1994).]