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45.1 Requirement Of Criminal Intent Or Culpable Mental State

    45.1.1 Requirement Of Criminal Intent Or Culpable Mental State: General Principles
    45.1.2 Proof Of Act Without Criminal Intent Is Insufficient To Convict
    45.1.3 Presumption That Silent Statute Requires Criminal Intent
    45.1.4 Ignorance Of The Law Instruction Improper When Required To Prove Willfulness Or Intentional Violation Of A Known Legal Duty

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PRACTICE NOTE: "Mens rea is, of course, a fundamental requirement of our criminal jurisprudence....This requirement has been the rule for at least a century....Much of the reason for insisting on mens rea is to prevent ostensibly innocuous conduct from unwittingly becoming criminal." (U.S. v. Licciardi (9th Cir. 1994) 30 F3d 1127, 1131.)

    "The requirement of mens rea as a predicate to criminal liability is a fundamental precept of the Anglo-American common law." (U.S. v. Garrett (5th Cir. 1993) 984 F2d 1402, 1410.)

    "A basic tenet of criminal law provides that...an act does not make one guilty unless his mind is guilty. Thus, at common law, nearly all crimes required proof that defendant not only committed a wrongful act, but that he did so with the requisite mens rea or culpable mental state. As history has witnessed the statutory codification of criminal offenses, enacting legislatures have employed such words as 'intentionally,' 'willfully,' or 'purposefully' to signify the common law requirement of mental culpability." (U.S. v. Bates (7th Cir. 1996) 96 F3d 964, 967; see also O'Malley, Grenig & Lee, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS 17.01 [Introduction] (West, 5th ed. 2000) [noting that much of the history regarding mental state or mens rea comes from the common law]; LaFave & Scott, Substantive Criminal Law (West, 1986) § 3.4 and § 3.5.)

    However, even if scienter is not expressly required by a statute, there is "a heavy presumption that Congress does not intend to impose criminal liability without some showing of mens rea; the contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil." (U.S. v. Forbes (4th Cir. 1995) 64 F3d 928, 931-32.)

    "[A] scienter requirement is presumed to apply to each of the statutory elements which criminalize otherwise innocent conduct, even if this is not the most natural grammatical reading of the statutory language." (U.S. v. Lacy (9th Cir. 1997) 119 F3d 742, 747.)

    See also FORECITE National™ 45.1.3 [Presumption That Silent Statute Requires Criminal Intent].

RESEARCH NOTES:

See generally, FORECITE National™ 305.9.9 [Intent].

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 VOLUME 5 - CHAPTER 45

RATIONALE: Without appropriate instruction the jurors may improperly focus only on the act committed rather than the act and the mental state.

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES: Concurrence of the act and mens rea of the crime is an essential element which must be proven by the prosecution. (See FORECITE National™ 45.4 [Concurrence Of Act And Intent].)

    See also FORECITE National™ 43.2 [Criminal Intent Is Not Alone Sufficient To Convict].

    See also FORECITE National™ 45.3.3 [Criminal Liability: After Acquired Intent Insufficient].

RESEARCH NOTES:

See generally, FORECITE National™ 305.9.9 [Intent].

FEDERALIZATION: To federalize this request, click here. [Constitutional Macro 3.6; 4.1].

    The prosecution must prove the required intent and/or mental state of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt.  Proof that the accused committed the alleged act is not alone sufficient to prove the requisite intent and/or mental state.

[Cf. COLORADO JURY INSTRUCTIONS, COLJI - Crim 8:01, use note [Criminal Intent] (West, 1983).]

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PRACTICE NOTE: The United States and California Supreme Courts have emphasized that felony offenses which bear harsh punishment are not the type of "public welfare" offenses for which courts will readily dispense with the mens rea requirement when construing a statute. (See Bryan v. U.S. (98) 524 US 184, 193 [141 LEd2d 197; 118 SCt 1939]; see also Staples v. U.S. (1994) 511 US 600, 616 [14 SCt 1793; 128 LEd2d 608]; People v. Coria (CA 1999) 21 C4th 868, 877 [89 CR2d 650, 656-57]; People v. Simon (CA 1995) 9 C4th 493, 520 [37 CR2d 278]; People v. Jones (IL 1992) 595 NE2d 1071, 1075 [criminal mens rea required even though statute is silent on mens rea].)  Hence, "guilty knowledge" is an "essential ingredient" of a malum in se offense.  (See State v. Smith (WA 1977) 562 P2d 659, 661; but see State v. Sims (WA 1992) 829 P2d 1075 [guilty knowledge is not an element of unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to manufacture or deliver].)

    For example, in Warfield v. State (MD 1989) 554 A2d 1238, 1249-51, the court explained why criminal statutes should be interpreted to require criminal intent. "To make culpable the inadvertent trespasser and the trespasser who entertains a reasonable belief that his conduct was proper would be unreasonable, illogical, inconsistent with common sense, and contrary to the interests of justice." (Warfield, 554 A2d at 1250; Morrison v. Commonwealth (KY 1980) 607 SW2d 114 [although statute does not include a mental state as an element, knowledge is necessary to sustain conviction and use of phrase "could have known" was reversible error].) "...[T]he presumption in favor of a scienter requirement should apply to each of the statutory elements which criminalize otherwise innocent conduct." (U.S. v. X-Citement Video Inc. (1994) 513 US 64, 72 [115 SCt 464; 130 LEd2d 372]; U.S. v. Garrett (5th Cir. 1993) 984 F2d 1402, 1412; People v. Terrell (IL 1989) 547 NE2d 145, 159 [in light of legislative silence, sexual assault statute construed to require mental state of knowledge, intent or recklessness].)

    See also FORECITE National™ 45.1.1 [Requirement Of Criminal Intent Or Culpable Mental State: General Principles].)

LaFave & Scott, Substantive Criminal Law (West, 1986) § 2.12(d)

Malum In Se And Malum Prohibitum. LaFave & Scott, Substantive Criminal Law (West 1986) § 1.6(b).

See generally, FORECITE National™ 305.9.9 [Intent].

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PRACTICE NOTE: When the statute requires a showing of "willfulness," it may be necessary to prove that the defendant’s conduct was an intentional violation of a known legal duty. (See FORECITE National™ 44.2 [Criminal Liability For Omission Of Statutory Duties Requires Knowledge Of That Duty]; see also e.g., U.S. v. Buford (5th Cir. 1989) 889 F2d 1406, 1409.) In such a case, it is improper to instruct the jury that ignorance of the law is not an excuse or that it is presumed that every person knows what the law forbids. (Ibid; see also People v. Garcia (CA 2001) 25 C4th 744, 754 [107 CR2d 355] [court erred in giving "ignorance of the law is no excuse" instruction "which on its face would allow the jury to convict defendant of failing to register as a sex offender even if he were unaware of his obligation to do so"]; People v. Hagen (CA 1998) 19 C4th 652, 660 [80 CR2d 24] [statutory "willfulness" requirement creates exception to common law presumption that ignorance or mistake of law is no excuse]; U.S. v. Rhone (DC Cir. 1989) 864 F2d 832, 836.)

RESEARCH NOTES:

Kahan, Ignorance of Law Is An Excuse -- But Only For the Virtuous, 96 Mich.L.Rev. 127 [questioning traditional explanations for the doctrine] (1997).

Green, Why It’s a Crime to Tear the Tag Off a Mattress: Overcriminalization and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses 46 Emery L.J. 1533 (1997).

See also FORECITE National™ 45.2.4 [General Intent: Requirement Of Knowing Commission Of The Acts Making The Conduct Criminal].

See also FORECITE National™ 46.1 [Willfully Defined: Knowledge Element].

See also FORECITE National™ 98.3.3.3 [Failure To File A Tax Return: Lack Of Intent To Violate A Known Duty As Defense Theory].

See also FORECITE National™ 252.8.1.3 [Distinction Between Mistake And Ignorance Of Law]..

See also FORECITE National™ 252.11.2 [Defense Theory: Good Faith In Tax Cases].

See also FORECITE National™ 252.9.1 [Mistake Of Law: Negation Of A Mental Element Of The Charge].

See also FORECITE National™ 252.9.4 [Ignorance Of The Law Due To Unavailable Law].

See generally, FORECITE National™ 305.9.9 [Intent].