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33.4 Possession Of Recently Stolen Property: Predicate Facts

    33.4.1 Possession Of Recently Stolen Property: Defense Theory That Predicate Facts Have Not Been Proven
    33.4.2 Failure To Prove That Possession Of Recently Stolen Property Was "Unexplained"
    33.4.3 Possession Of Recently Stolen Property: Failure To Prove That The Property Was In "Conscious Possession" Of Defendant
    33.4.4 Possession Of Recently Stolen Property: Failure Of Prosecution To Prove That The Possession Was "Recent"
    33.4.5 Possession Of Recently Stolen Property: "Recently" Is A Relative Term
    33.4.6 Defense Theory That Possession Of Stolen Property Was Not Recent: Factors To Consider
    33.4.7 Defense Theory That Defendant Did Not Have Possession Of Recently Stolen Property: Definition Of Possession
    33.4.8 Possession Of Recently Stolen Property: Defense Theory That Prosecution Has Not Proven That Possession Was Exclusive
    33.4.9 Inference From Possession Of Recently Stolen Property: Possession Issues
    33.4.10 Possession Of Recently Stolen Property: Defense Theory That Prosecution Has Not Proven The Burglar And Thief To Be The Same Person

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RATIONALE: The validity of any inference from the defendant's possession of stolen property depends upon proof of preliminary facts such as the stolen character of the property, defendant's possession of it, etc. Without an explanatory instruction the jury may not understand the necessity that these preliminary facts be proven before any inference can be made.

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES: "An inference or a presumption of a defendant's guilt of a burglary or of a theft sufficient to sustain a conviction may arise from the appellant's possession of property stolen or taken in a recent burglary. However, in the prosecution for either a theft or a burglary, to warrant such an inference or presumption of guilt from the circumstances of possession alone, such possession must be personal, must be recent, must be unexplained, and must involve a distinct and conscious assertion of right to the property by the defendant." [Citations.] (Rodriguez v. State (TX 1977) 549 SW2d 747, 749; see also People v. Morris (CA 1988) 46 C3d 1, 40-41 [249 CR 119] [error to give unqualified instruction on the effect of recent possession of stolen property when the evidence was conflicting or unclear that the defendant was either in possession of stolen property or that the property possessed was in fact stolen]; State v. Clark (MO 1969) 438 SW2d 277, 279; State v. Durham (MO 1963) 367 SW2d 619, 622 ["to authorize the inference of guilt, the defendant's possession of the stolen property should not be too remote in point of time from the crime, and it should be a personal possession, exclusive, distinct and conscious, and unexplained"].)

    Accordingly, when the defendant's possession of recently stolen property is an essential link in the prosecution's chain of evidence, each of the preliminary facts necessary to trigger the inference should be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. (See e.g., Jolly v. Commonwealth (VA 1923) 118 SE 109, 113; see also Griffin v. State (MS 1973) 279 So2d 609, 611 [burden of proof was on State to prove beyond reasonable doubt that property described in indictment was stolen, that property found in possession of accused was stolen property and that its possession was recently after the larceny].)

    See also FORECITE National™ 270.4.2 [Proof Beyond A Reasonable Doubt: Applicable To Subordinate Facts Essential To Proof Of An Element Of A Crime].

FEDERALIZATION: To federalize this request, click here. [Constitutional Macro 2.2; 2.3; 2.4; 4.1].

CAVEAT: This instruction is designed for use when there is a factual issue as to whether the defendant failed to explain actual possession of recently stolen property. If there is no such factual issue, the defense will probably not want to request instruction on this issue.

See generally, FORECITE National™ 305.9.3 [Inference From Possession Of Property].

See also generally, FORECITE National™ 305.16.7 [Possession Of Stolen Property].

See generally, FORECITE National™ 33.1.3 [Possession Of Recently Stolen Property: Federal Circuit Model Instructions And Notes].

    The court instructs the jury that before possession of stolen property creates even a presumption that the person is a thief, the Commonwealth must prove by the evidence, beyond all reasonable doubt, that the possession was personal; that it was exclusive; that it was recent; that it was unexplained, and that it involved a distinct and conscious assertion of property by the defendant.

[Jolly v. Commonwealth (VA 1923) 118 SE 109, 113.]

    You may not consider defendant's alleged possession of the property for any purpose unless you find beyond a reasonable doubt that:

    I charge you that the conscious exclusive possession by the defendant of recently stolen property if unexplained or falsely explained permits but does not require the jury to infer that the defendant committed a burglary and/or a larceny of the property.

    Of course you need not draw any guilty inference at all or may infer that he obtained or possessed the property in some way other than by stealing.

    You must consider and evaluate all the testimony which bears upon the recent exclusive possession inference including the manner in which the burglary and larceny is alleged to have occurred, the location of the burglary, the nature of the alleged stolen property, the length of time between the alleged burglary and the time the property is alleged to have been found in the defendant's possession, the nature and circumstances of the alleged possession by the defendant, the defendant's explanation of the possession, if any, and access to the property by persons other than the defendant, if any.

    If the People did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that, one, the property was stolen, two, the defendant recently, exclusively and consciously possessed it, and three, the defendant was without a truthful explanation as to how he obtained it, you cannot infer guilt from possession of the property.

    On the other hand, if you find that the People have proven beyond a reasonable doubt that one, the property was stolen, two, the defendant had recent exclusive and conscious possession of it, and three, there was no truthful explanation of it, you must then decide from all of the facts and circumstances which inference to draw. That the defendant committed the [burglary] [and] [larceny] or that [he] [she] obtained possession in some other way.

[Adapted from People v. Dobbins (NY 1983) 459 NYS2d 484, 485.]

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RATIONALE: When the question of whether the defendant's possession of stolen property was satisfactorily explained is an essential fact, the prosecution should be required to prove it beyond a reasonable doubt. Without an explanatory instruction the jury may not understand this requirement.

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES: "Possession of stolen property, accompanied by no explanation, or an unsatisfactory explanation of the possession, or by suspicious circumstances, will justify an inference that the goods were received with knowledge that they had been stolen. This rule is applied where the accused is found in possession of the articles soon after they were stolen." (People v. Lyons (CA 1958) 50 C2d 245, 258 [324 P2d 556]; see also Barnes v. U.S. (1973) 412 US 837, 845 [93 SCt 2357; 37 LEd2d 380]; State v. Ippolito (NJ 1996) 671 A2d 165, 170 [charge that defendant's exclusive possession of stolen property shortly after theft justified inference that defendant was thief was inappropriate and unduly prejudicial, where defendant admitted that he took property and possessed it from time it was taken until its discovery, but explained his possession by claim of right]; State v. Clark (MO 1969) 438 SW2d 277, 279 [inference of guilt is permissible from the possession of property recently stolen in a burglary, and the inference exists both as to the burglary and the stealing].)

    The failure to inform the jury that the inference does not apply unless the prosecution proves the lack of a satisfactory explanation beyond a reasonable doubt, unconstitutionally shifts the burden of proof to the defendant in violation the Due Process clause of the 14th amendment. (See FORECITE National™ 270.4.2 [Proof Beyond A Reasonable Doubt: Applicable To Subordinate Facts Essential To Proof Of An Element Of A Crime].)

    See also FORECITE National™ 33.2.1 [Recent Possession Of Stolen Property: Defendant Has No Burden Or Obligation To Furnish Explanation].

FEDERALIZATION: To federalize this request, click here. [Constitutional Macro 2.2; 2.3; 2.4; 4.1].

See generally, FORECITE National™ 305.9.3 [Inference From Possession Of Property].

See also generally, FORECITE National™ 305.16.7 [Possession Of Stolen Property].

See generally, FORECITE National™ 33.1.3 [Possession Of Recently Stolen Property: Federal Circuit Model Instructions And Notes].

    No inference of guilt may be made from the defendant's conscious possession of recently stolen property when such possession was satisfactorily explained. If you have a reasonable doubt as to whether or not the possession was satisfactorily explained, you may not infer guilt based solely upon the defendant's possession of the property and the existence of slight corroboration. Rather, guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt by evidence other than the defendant's possession of the property.

    No inference of guilt may be made from the defendant's conscious possession of recently stolen property when such possession was satisfactorily explained. To be satisfactory, the explanation need only raise a reasonable doubt as to whether or not the defendant came into possession of the property by criminal means. If you have such a reasonable doubt as to whether or not the possession was satisfactorily explained, you may not infer guilt based solely upon the defendant's possession of the property.

    The court instructs the jury that before possession of stolen property creates even a presumption that the person is a thief, the Commonwealth must prove by the evidence, beyond all reasonable doubt, that the possession was personal; that it was exclusive; that it was recent; that it was unexplained, and that it involved a distinct and conscious assertion of property by the defendant.

[Jolly v. Commonwealth (VA 1923) 118 SE 109, 113.]

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RATIONALE: Without an explanatory instruction, the jury may not understand that the prosecution must prove that the property was in the conscious possession of the defendant.

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES: Conscious possession is one of the predicate facts that must be proven before the jury may draw any inference from the defendant's possession of stolen property. (See e.g., People v. Dobbins (NY 1983) 459 NY2d 484, 485; Jolly v. Commonwealth (VA 1923) 118 SE 109, 113.)

    Hence, when conscious possession is an essential fact, it must be proven by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt. (See FORECITE National™ 33.4.1 [Possession Of Recently Stolen Property: Defense Theory That Predicate Facts Have Not Been Proven].)

    See also FORECITE National™ 270.4.2 [Proof Beyond A Reasonable Doubt: Applicable To Subordinate Facts Essential To Proof Of An Element Of A Crime].

    See also FORECITE National™ Chapter 56 [Possession].

FEDERALIZATION: To federalize this request, click here. [Constitutional Macro 2.2; 2.3; 2.4; 4.1].

See generally, FORECITE National™ 305.9.3 [Inference From Possession Of Property].

See also generally, FORECITE National™ 305.16.7 [Possession Of Stolen Property].

See generally, FORECITE National™ 33.1.3 [Possession Of Recently Stolen Property: Federal Circuit Model Instructions And Notes].

    You may not consider the defendant's alleged possession of the property for any purpose unless you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant consciously and knowingly possessed the property.

    The court instructs the jury that before possession of stolen property creates even a presumption that the person is a thief, the Commonwealth must prove by the evidence, beyond all reasonable doubt, that the possession was personal; that it was exclusive; that it was recent; that it was unexplained, and that it involved a distinct and conscious assertion of property by the defendant.

[Jolly v. Commonwealth (VA 1923) 118 SE 109, 113.]

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PRACTICE NOTE: See State v. Giordano (NJ 1939) 3 A2d 290, 291; Griffin v. State (MS 1973) 279 So2d 609, 611; State v. Hall (ME 1978) 383 A2d 663, 665.

    See also FORECITE National™ 270.4.2 [Proof Beyond A Reasonable Doubt: Applicable To Subordinate Facts Essential To Proof Of An Element Of A Crime].

    See FORECITE National™ 300.4.4 [Contradictory Instructions On Element].

See generally, FORECITE National™ 305.9.3 [Inference From Possession Of Property].

See also generally, FORECITE National™ 305.16.7 [Possession Of Stolen Property].

See generally, FORECITE National™ 33.1.3 [Possession Of Recently Stolen Property: Federal Circuit Model Instructions And Notes].

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RATIONALE: An important component of the inference that a person in possession of stolen property was that the property was "recently" stolen. For example, a common inference that is suggested to contradict the inference that the defendant was the thief is that the property was innocently obtained from another. The reasonableness of such a contrary inference would depend upon the nature of the property – i.e., how quickly and easily it could be sold – and other circumstances bearing on whether the theft of the property was so recent that the defendant could not have innocently obtained it from the actual thief. Accordingly, it may be appropriate to instruct the jury on this point.

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES: The term "recently," as in recently stolen property, ... is "a relative term, depending very substantially upon the circumstances of the particular case for its meaning." (U.S. v. Wolfenbarger (6th Cir.1970) 426 F2d 992, 995.)  "No definite time can be fixed as to when, as a matter of law, possession is or is not recent." (VIRGINIA MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS - CRIMINAL 36.300, comment [Larceny-Possession Interferences] (Lexis, 2000); see also Wilborne v. Commonwealth (VA 1943) 28 SE2d 1; U.S. v. Johnson (6th Cir. 1984) 741 F2d 854, 857.)

    A major factor in determining the meaning of "recently" is the type of goods possessed. If the goods are unique and hard to dispose of, "recently" can mean a longer period of time than if the goods are ordinarily and easily sold. (United States v. Gordo, (5th Cir. 1970) 421 F2d 1068, 1073; United States v. Baxa (7th Cir. 1965) 340 F2d 259, 261.)

    Another major factor is the interval between the theft and the defendant's possession. The longer the period of time between the theft and the proof of possession, the weaker the inference is. (United States v. Coggins (DC Cir. 1970) 433 F2d 1357, 1362; United States v. Wolfenbarger, 426 F2d at 995; Pendergrast v. United States (DC Cir.1969) 416 F2d 776, 790.)

    See also FORECITE National™ 33.5.6 [Possession Of Recently Stolen Property: Defense Theory That The Passage Of Time Makes Any Inference Less Probative].

FEDERALIZATION: To federalize this request, click here. [Constitutional Macro 2.2; 2.3; 2.4; 4.1].

See generally, FORECITE National™ 305.9.3 [Inference From Possession Of Property].

See also generally, FORECITE National™ 305.16.7 [Possession Of Stolen Property].

See generally, FORECITE National™ 31.1.3 [ Possession Of Recently Stolen Property: Federal Circuit Model Instructions And Notes].

    The term 'recently' is a relative term that has no fixed meaning. The longer the period of time since the property was stolen, the more doubtful the inference of knowledge becomes.

[7TH CIRCUIT FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS - CRIMINAL 3.14 [Possession Of Stolen Property- Inference] ¶ 2 (1999).]

    The term 'recently' is a relative term. Whether property may be considered as recently-stolen depends upon the nature of the property, and all of the facts and circumstances of the case.

[See Barnes v. U.S. (1973) 412 US 837, 840 [93 SCt 2357; 37 LEd2d 380]; Pendergrast v. United States (DC Cir.1969) 416 F2d 776, 790-91; see also Alexander, MAINE JURY INSTRUCTIONS MANUAL 6-44 [Instruction 45-Exclusive Possession Inference: Burglary-Theft] (Lexis, 1999).]

    The term 'recently' is a relative term that has no fixed meaning. Whether property may be considered as recently stolen depends upon the nature of the property and all the facts and circumstances shown by the evidence in the case. The shorter the period between the theft and the possession, the stronger the inference becomes. Conversely, the longer the period of time since the theft the more doubtful becomes the inference which may reasonably be drawn from the unexplained possession.

[See Barnes v. U.S. (1973) 412 US 837, 840 [93 SCt 2357; 37 LEd2d 380]; Pendergrast v. United States (DC Cir.1969) 416 F2d 776, 790-91; see also NEW JERSEY MODEL JURY CHARGES - CRIMINAL Chap. 20 [Offenses Against Property: Supplemental Charge on Theft] 5/28/80 ¶ 5 (New Jersey ICLE 4th ed. 1997).]

    The term 'recently' is a relative term. Whether property may be considered as recently-stolen depends upon the nature of the property and the circumstances. The longer the period of time since the theft, the more doubtful becomes the inference which may be drawn from unexplained possession.

[See Barnes v. U.S. (1973) 412 US 837, 840 [93 SCt 2357; 37 LEd2d 380]; Pendergrast v. United States (DC Cir.1969) 416 F2d 776, 790-91; Thomas v. State (TE 1971) 463 SW2d 687, 688; see also TENNESSEE PATTERN INSTRUCTIONS - CRIMINAL, T.P.I.- Crim 42.20 [Inference From Possession Of Stolen Property] (West, 4th ed. 2000).]

    The term 'recently' is a relative term. The longer the period of time since the theft the more doubtful becomes the inference which may reasonably be drawn from unexplained possession.

[See Barnes v. U.S. (1973) 412 US 837, 840 [93 SCt 2357; 37 LEd2d 380]; Pendergrast v. United States (DC Cir.1969) 416 F2d 776, 790-91; see also VIRGINIA MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS - CRIMINAL 36.300, comment [Larceny-Possession Interferences] ¶ 2 (Lexis, 2000).]

    The word 'recently' does not mean a set time, but it is an important word. The longer the time between the theft and the evidence of possession, the more doubtful it is that possessing the property shows that the defendant [knew it was stolen] [was the person who stole it].

[See Barnes v. U.S. (1973) 412 US 837, 840 [93 SCt 2357; 37 LEd2d 380];  Pendergrast v. United States (DC Cir.1969) 416 F2d 776, 790-91; see also CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 3.06, [Inference From the Possession Of Recently Stolen Property] para. 3 (Bar Association of the District of Columbia, 4th ed. 1993).]

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RATIONALE: When the defense theory focuses on whether the possession of stolen property was "recent," instruction on the factors to consider may be necessary to assure that the jury reliably resolves this issue.

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES: See FORECITE National™ 33.4.5 [Possession Of Recently Stolen Property: "Recently" Is A Relative Term].

FEDERALIZATION: To federalize this request, click here. [Constitutional Macro 2.2; 2.3; 2.4; 4.1].

See generally, FORECITE National™ 305.9.3 [Inference From Possession Of Property].

See also generally, FORECITE National™ 305.16.7 [Possession Of Stolen Property].

See generally, FORECITE National™ 31.1.3 [ Possession Of Recently Stolen Property: Federal Circuit Model Instructions And Notes].

    In deciding whether the defendant’s possession was sufficiently close in time to the theft to be considered as evidence of participation in the theft, consider all the surrounding circumstances, including such factors as the type of property stolen, how the defendant may have come into possession, and the amount of time between the theft and the defendant’s possession.

[See generally Barnes v. U.S. (1973) 412 US 837, 841 [93 SCt 2357; 37 LEd 2d 380]; Pendergrast v. United States (DC Cir.1969) 416 F2d 776, 790-91; see also MARYLAND CRIMINAL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, MPJI-Cr 4:32.3, [Theft-Inference From Exclusive Unexplained Possession Of Recently Stolen Goods] para. 2 (Micpel,1999).]

    The term 'recently,' is a relative term that has no fixed meaning. Whether property may be considered as recently stolen depends upon the nature of the property, and all the facts and circumstances shown by the evidence in the case. The shorter the period between the theft and the possession, the stronger the inference becomes. Conversely, the longer the period of time since the theft the more doubtful becomes the inference which may reasonably be drawn from the unexplained possession.

[See Barnes v. U.S. (1973) 412 US 837, 840 [93 SCt 2357; 37 LEd2d 380]; Pendergrast v. United States (DC Cir.1969) 416 F2d 776, 790-91; see also NEW JERSEY MODEL JURY CHARGES - CRIMINAL Chap. 20 [Offenses Against Property: Supplemental Charge on Theft] 5/28/80 ¶ 5 (New Jersey ICLE 4th ed. 1997).]

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    33.4.7    Defense Theory That Defendant Did Not Have Possession Of Recently Stolen Property: Definition Of Possession

PRACTICE NOTE: Many pattern instructions inform the jury that an inference of guilt may be drawn from the defendant's "conscious possession" of recently stolen property. Since this inference is predicated upon the defendant's possession of the property, the jury should be instructed upon the definition of possession.  (See e.g., People v. Zyduck (CA 1969) 270 CA2d 334, 335 [75 CR 616] ["possession must be established before the inference of guilty knowledge can be drawn ...."]; see also People v. Smith (CA 1954) 128 CA2d 706, 709 [275 P2d 919].)

    See FORECITE National™ Chapter 56 [Possession].

    See FORECITE National™ 33.4.3 [Failure To Prove That The Property Was In "Conscious Possession" Of Defendant].

    See also FORECITE National™ 300.4.4 [Contradictory Instructions On Element].

See generally, FORECITE National™ 305.9.3 [Inference From Possession Of Property].

See also generally, FORECITE National™ 305.16.7 [Possession Of Stolen Property].

See generally, FORECITE National™ 33.1.3 [Possession Of Recently Stolen Property: Federal Circuit Model Instructions And Notes].

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RATIONALE: The jury should not be permitted to infer the defendant's guilt from the presence of stolen property to which the defendant and another person has joint access or possession.

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES: When more than one person has access to an object such joint access is not alone sufficient to establish possession. (See FORECITE National™ 56.2.6 [Possession: Joint Access Insufficient].) Hence, the mere presence of recently stolen property on the premises of a third person with whom the defendant was living, though unexplained, is insufficient to establish guilt of larceny or burglary. (See e.g., Scott v. State (NE 1931) 236 NW 608, 609.)

    Rather the evidence must show that the defendant was in exclusive or joint possession of the property for the presumption/inference to apply. (Davis v. State (MD 1969) 256 A2d 819, 820 ["such possession must be exclusive but the cases explain exclusive does not mean exclusively in one person; the possession can be joint"]; see also People v. Gray (IL 1978) 377 NE2d 1311,1313; Blakeley v. State (TX 1985) 692 SW2d 206, 208; Drinkard v. Commonwealth (VA 1935) 178 SE 25, 27 [proof that defendant accompanied a friend to a store where the friend attempted to sell a recently stolen item was insufficient to establish that the defendant was in sole or even joint possession of the item]; see State v. Dyett (UT 1948) 199 P2d 155, 156 [under statute making the possession of recently stolen property prima facie evidence of guilt, possession must be personal, conscious and exclusive, and it is insufficient, if there is a mere association of defendant with property recently stolen, proof of only constructive possession, or mere presence of accused at place where stolen property is found]; see also Scott v. State (NE 1931) 236 NW 608, 613 [mere presence of recently stolen property on premises of third person with whom defendant was living, though unexplained, held insufficient to establish guilt of theft or robbery]; Rodriguez v. State (TX 1977) 549 SW2d 747, 748 [evidence that officers had, while defendant was in hospital, found file box, recently taken in a burglary, in closet of bedroom which defendant had shared with another was insufficient alone to show that defendant had the personal possession and had asserted a distinct and conscious right to the property sufficient for conviction for theft].)

FEDERALIZATION: To federalize this request, click here. [Constitutional Macro 2.2; 2.3; 2.4; 4.1].

See generally, FORECITE National™ 305.9.3 [Inference From Possession Of Property].

See also generally, FORECITE National™ 305.16.7 [Possession Of Stolen Property].

See generally, FORECITE National™ 33.1.3 [Possession Of Recently Stolen Property: Federal Circuit Model Instructions And Notes].

    Defendant's asportation of the property is an essential element of the crime of ______________ (insert charged offense, e.g., theft or larceny). If you find proof beyond a reasonable doubt that:

    1.  The property was recently stolen;

    2.  The defendant had exclusive possession of it; and

    3.  The defendant failed or falsely explained [his] [her] possession of the property, that is evidence from which you may, but are not required to find or infer that the defendant took the property.

[See 8TH CIRCUIT MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS - CRIMINAL 4.13 [Specific Inferences] (2000).]

    The court instructs the jury that before possession of stolen property creates even a presumption that the person is a thief, the Commonwealth must prove by the evidence, beyond all reasonable doubt, that the possession was personal; that it was exclusive; that it was recent; that it was unexplained, and that it involved a distinct and conscious assertion of property by the defendant.

[See Jolly v. Commonwealth (VA 1923) 118 SE 109, 113.]

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    See FORECITE National™ Chapter 56 [Possession].

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RATIONALE: Often the defendant's possession of recently stolen property is relied upon as proof that the defendant committed burglary. Such an inference is actually predicated on the dual inferences that (1) the defendant stole the property and (2) in order to steal the property the defendant committed the burglary. However, to support such an inference it must be proven that the burglary and theft were committed at the same time by the same person.

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES: The inference of guilt, which arises from a defendant's being found in exclusive possession of particular goods, is justified only if the State has shown, by evidence independent of defendant's exclusive possession, that a recent theft of those goods has occurred. (See FORECITE National™ 33.5.2 [Unexplained Possession Of Stolen Property Not Alone Sufficient To Sustain Finding Of Theft Or Burglary]; see also FORECITE National™ 33.5.4 [Recent Possession Of Stolen Goods: Inapplicable To Receiving Or Theft By Receiving].) If the independent evidence shows that the goods were stolen in the course of a burglary, the inference may be extended to include guilt of the burglary. (State v. Salisbury (ME 1980) 417 A2d 431, 433-44; see also Fields v. Commonwealth (VA 1974) 207 SE2d 822.)

    In other words, only if the evidence warrants an inference that the burglary and theft were committed at same time by the same person as part of the same transaction, can exclusive possession of the stolen goods shortly thereafter give rise to an inference that the possessor is guilty of the burglary. (Salisbury, 417 A2d at 443.)

FEDERALIZATION: To federalize this request, click here. [Constitutional Macro 2.2; 2.3; 2.4; 4.1].

See generally, FORECITE National™ 305.9.3 [Inference From Possession Of Property].

See also generally, FORECITE National™ 305.16.7 [Possession Of Stolen Property].

See generally, FORECITE National™ 33.1.3 [Possession Of Recently Stolen Property: Federal Circuit Model Instructions And Notes].

* See FORECITE National™ 270.4.2 [Proof Beyond A Reasonable Doubt: Applicable To Subordinate Facts Essential To Proof Of An Element Of A Crime].

[See Fields v. Commonwealth (VA 1974) 207 SE2d 822; State v. Salisbury (ME 1980) 417 A2d 431, 433-44.]