Chapter 17

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17.4 Juror Anonymity

    17.4.1 Juror Anonymity Improper Without A Good Cause
    17.4.2 Juror Anonymity Is Prejudicial To The Defendant
    17.4.3 If The Court Orders Juror Anonymity, Cautionary Procedures And Instruction May Be Necessary
    17.4.4 Limiting Admonition May Not Cure Improper Juror Anonymity
    17.4.5 Jury Anonymity Does Not Represent The Court’s Opinion
    17.4.6 Juror Anonymity: Presence Of Counsel When Deciding
    17.4.7 Juror Anonymity: Request For More Extensive Voir Dire

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17.4.1 Juror Anonymity Is Improper Without A Good Cause

PRACTICE NOTE: Use of anonymous jury may be justified by need for security. (United States v. Shryock (9th Cir. 2003) 342 F3d 948.) Trial by an anonymous jury is a "drastic measure, one which should be undertaken only in limited and carefully delineated circumstances." (U.S. v. Ross (11th Cir. 1994) 33 F3d 1507, 1519; see also Shryock, 342 F3d at 970-71.) In balancing the government’s interest in safeguarding the jurors the totality of the circumstances must be considered. (Ibid.; see also generally Caplow & Griffin, Multidefendant Criminal Cases: Federal Law & Procedure (West, 1998) § 12:5, pp. 226-27.)

Every circuit that has addressed the issue has held that "a lower court's decision to empanel an anonymous jury is entitled to a deference and is subject to abuse of discretion review." (Shryock, 342 F3d at 970.) However, "empaneling an anonymous jury is an unusual measure that is warranted only where there is a strong reason to believe the jury needs protection or to safeguard the integrity of the justice system, so that the jury can perform its factfinding function. [Citation.]" (Shryock, 342 F3d at 971; see also U.S. v. Ross (11th Cir. 1994) 33 F3d 1507.)

Typically, juror anonymity is permitted upon a showing of good cause. (See e.g., Erickson v. Superior Court (CA 1997) 55 CA4th 755 [64 CR2d 230].) Deciding to withhold even the name and address of a member of the venire "require[s] a trial court to make a sensitive appraisal of the climate surrounding a trial and a prediction as to the potential security or publicity problems that may arise during the proceedings." (U.S. v. Childress (DC Cir. 1995) 58 F3d 693, 702; see also U.S. v. Branch (5th Cir. 1996) 91 F3d 699, 723 (reversed on other grounds in Castillo v. U.S. (2000) 530 US 120 [120 SCt 2090; 147 LEd2d 94]).) Therefore, a "strong reason" must exist for use of an anonymous jury and if anonymity is ordered, "reasonable precautions" must be taken by the court to ensure defendant’s fundamental rights are protected. (See U.S. v. Wong (2nd Cir. 1994) 40 F3d 1347, 1376 U.S. v. Riggio (5th Cir. 1995) 70 F3d 336, 340 and fn 23.)

The following are examples of good cause which may justify use of an anonymous jury: "(1) the defendants' involvement in organized crime; (2) the defendants' participation in a group with the capacity to harm jurors; (3) the defendants' past attempts to interfere with the judicial process or witnesses; (4) the potential that, if convicted, the defendants will suffer a lengthy incarceration and substantial monetary penalties; and, (5) extensive publicity that could enhance the possibility that jurors' names would become public and expose them to intimidation and harassment." (Branch, 91 F3d at 724.)

In addition, district courts should look to the "totality of the circumstances." (U.S. v. Ross (11th Cir. 1996) 33 F3d 1507, 1521, fn 26; see also U.S. v. Sanchez (5th Cir. 1996) 74 F3d 562, 564-65 [rejecting an anonymous jury because there was no indication that the jurors would be subjected to intimidation and harassment].) Hence, in any case where the jurors are referred to by number without the required showing of necessity, the rights of the defendant to a fair trial by jury and due process under the 5th, 6th and 14th Amendments to the federal constitution may be implicated. (See FORECITE National™ 17.4.2 [Juror Anonymity Is Prejudicial To The Defendant].)

RESEARCH NOTES:

See A Manual On Jury Trial Procedures [2.9.1 Anonymous Juries: General Principles].

See also Benchbook For U.S. District Court Judges [2.05.3 Jury Selection-Criminal: Anonymous Juries].

See also Benchbook For U.S. District Court Judges [2.06 Standard Voir Dire Questions-Criminal].

See also generally, FORECITE National™ 305.10.1 [Juror Anonymity].

See also generally, FORECITE National™ 305.16.5 [Physical Restraints, Courtroom Security, Disruption, Etc.].

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17.4.2 Juror Anonymity Is Prejudicial To The Defendant

PRACTICE NOTE: Reference to jurors by number rather than name violates a defendant's constitutional rights to a fair trial and due process. Procedural measures violate the defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial if they are inherently prejudicial or cause actual prejudice. (Holbrook v. Flynn (1986) 475 US 560, 572 [106 SCt 1340; 89 LEd2d 525]; see also Illinois v. Allen (1970) 397 US 337 [90 SCt 1057; 25 LEd2d 353]; Morgan v. Aispuro (9th Cir. 1991) 946 F2d 1462, 1465 [enhanced security measures may implicate the 6th Amendment right to a fair trial and the presumption of innocence]; but see U.S. v. Scarfo (3rd Cir. 1988) 850 F2d 1015, 1026 ["juror who fears a defendant's retaliation might be more apt to return a guilty verdict despite such fears rather than because of them"].)

When the jury is anonymous, the impact upon the jurors is inherently prejudicial.

First, referring to the jurors by number implies that the defendant is a "dangerous person from whom the jury must be protected, thereby implicating the defendant's constitutional right to presumption of innocence." (U.S. v. Thomas (2nd Cir. 1985) 757 F2d 1359, 1364; see also Illinois v. Allen (1970) 397 US 337, 344 [90 SCt 1057; 25 LEd2d 353] [shackling of defendant is likely to lead jurors to infer that he or she is a violent person disposed to commit crimes of the type alleged]; U.S. v. Scarfo (3rd Cir. 1988) 850 F2d 1015, 1021-230.)

Second, the procedure suggests that the defendant may attempt to influence the outcome of the trial by intimidation which implies a consciousness of guilt and is highly prejudicial. (See e.g., People v. Hannon (CA 1977) 19 C3d 588, 600 [138 CR 885].)

Third, the jurors will naturally assume that the judge made the anonymity order based on his or her predetermination that the defendant is guilty and, therefore, the jury needs to be protected. (See FORECITE National™ 17.1.2 [Courtroom Security: Sources Of Prejudice To The Defendant].) Such an assumption would be highly prejudicial and would undermine the presumption of innocence. (Ibid.)

Fourth, unnecessary juror anonymity may diminish the jurors' sense of responsibility for their verdict which undermines the reliability of the verdict in violation of the right to a fair jury trial and due process (5th, 6th and 14th Amendments; see FORECITE National™ 300.29.1 [Federal Constitutional Rights Implicated By Unreliable Trial Or Conviction].) And, in capital cases, the 8th Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment may also be implicated. (Cf. Caldwell v. Mississippi (1985) 472 US 320, 328-34 [105 SCt 2633; 86 LEd2d 231] [reliability of jury verdict undermined when jurors' sense of personal responsibility is compromised].)

In sum, "[t]he dangers of impaneling an anonymous jury are an increase in bias against the defendant and a threat to the presumption of innocence." (Caplow & Griffin, Multidefendant Criminal Cases: Federal Law & Procedure (West, 1998) § 12:5, p. 226; see also U.S. v. Ross (11th Cir. 1996) 33 F3d 1507, 1519.)

RESEARCH NOTES:

See also Benchbook For U.S. District Court Judges [2.05.3 Jury Selection-Criminal: Anonymous Juries].

See also Benchbook For U.S. District Court Judges [2.06 Standard Voir Dire Questions-Criminal].

See also generally, FORECITE National™ 305.10.1 [Juror Anonymity].

See also generally, FORECITE National™ 305.16.5 [Physical Restraints, Courtroom Security, Disruption, Etc.].

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17.4.3 If The Court Orders Juror Anonymity, Cautionary Procedures And Instruction May Be Necessary

RATIONALE: Even if juror anonymity is properly ordered, there is a danger that the jury will prejudicially speculate against the defendant as a result of the fact that their names have been kept secret.

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES: Once the court finds that impaneling an anonymous jury is justified, it may be necessary to take reasonable precautions to minimize any prejudicial effects to the defendant. (See, e.g., U.S. v. DeLuca (1st Cir. 1998)137 F3d 24, 31 [reasonable safeguards must be adopted by the trial court to minimize any risk of infringement upon the fundamental rights of the accused]; U.S. v. Paccione (2nd Cir. 1991) 949 F2d 1183, 1192-93; U.S. v. Tutino (2nd Cir. 1989) 883 F2d 1125, 1132-33; U.S. v. Thomas (2nd Cir. 1985) 757 F2d 1359, 1364.)

"The danger that the jury might infer that the need for anonymity was due to the defendant’s character may also be minimized where the court gives the jurors ‘a plausible and nonprejudicial reason for not disclosing their identities or for taking other security measures.’ [citation.]" (Caplow & Griffin, Multidefendant Criminal Cases: Federal Law & Procedure (West, 1998) § 12:5, pp. 231-32.) For example, the jury may be instructed that anonymity is a common practice (see U.S. v. Tutino (2nd Cir. 1989) 883 F2d 1125, 1133) or that it is being used to protect the jurors from the pressures of the media. (See United States v. Edwards (5th Cir. 2002) 303 F3d 606, 613 [jurors were instructed that the reason for the anonymity was a concern about publicity, so that any concern for their safety would not prejudice the defendants]; U.S. v. LoCascio (2nd Cir. 1993) 6 F3d 924, 947 [instruction approved that informed jurors that protective measures were necessary because of "undue publicity"]; Maldonado-Rivera (2nd Cir. 1990) 922 F2d 934, 971; U.S. v. Thomas (2nd Cir. 1985) 757 F2d 1359, 1365, fn 1; [jury told that sequestration and anonymity required because of "considerable publicity" among "the media and the public"]; Caplow & Griffin, Multidefendant Criminal Cases: Federal Law & Procedure (West, 1998) § 12:5, p. 232.)

For example, the court should "instruct the jury at the outset of the trial that these special procedures are routine and designed to protect the jury from any contacts by the media with respect to the ... case. This plausible and nonprejudicial reason for not disclosing the jurors’ identity or taking any other security measures will minimize the possibility that the anonymous procedure would cast unfair aspersions on the defendants [citations]." (U.S. v. Gambino (S.D. NY 1992) 809 FSupp 1061, 1068.)

Additionally, the court should protect the defendant’s right to a fair and impartial jury by conducting a "probing voir dire that will attempt to uncover any biases that jurors might have..." (Ibid.; see also e.g., U.S. v. Vario (2nd Cir. 1991) 943 F2d 236, 241-42; U.S. v. Barnes (2nd Cir. 1979) 604 F2d 121, 140.) The voir dire should also be supplemented by use of a "comprehensive jury questionnaire to insure that both the government and defense counsel will have an 'arsenal of information’ about each potential juror containing ‘responses to questions concerning his own life, as well as his attitudes about the issues that would arise in the case’ and, therefore, the parties will be able to intelligently exercise their challenges for cause and peremptory challenges. (U.S. v. Branch (5th Cir. 1996) 91 F3d 699, 723-24 [anonymous jury instruction given due to the public attention surrounding the case] (reversed on other grounds in Castillo v. U.S. (2000) 530 US 120 [120 SCt 2090; 147 LEd2d 94]); U.S. v. Halliburton (9th Cir. 1989) 870 F2d 557 [jury informed that escort was due to the neighborhood and late court sessions]; U.S. v. Gambino (S.D. NY 1992) 809 FSupp 1061, 1068.)

CAVEAT I: Of course, the decision whether to request such an instruction requires careful evaluation of whether it will unduly emphasize the factor sought to be limited. (See "CAVEAT" to FORECITE National™ 17.2.2.1 [Instruction That Shackling Is Routine Practice Not Related To Defendant]; see also Hollander & Bergman, Everytrial Criminal Defense Resource Book (West, 1999) Chapter 1-1:18, p. 1-13 [counsel will need to make a tactical judgment about whether the instructions regarding juror anonymity are more beneficial than detrimental].) Consideration should also be given to the impact of the cautionary instruction on the potential constitutional challenge on appeal. Whether requested or not counsel should consider emphasizing the inadequacy of a limiting instruction due to the danger it will highlight the prejudice. (See FORECITE National™ 17.4.4 [Limiting Admonition May Not Cure Improper Juror Anonymity].)

NOTE: Moreover, by analogy to shackling, if the jurors are referred to by number over defendant's objection, a limiting instruction may be required sua sponte unless the defendant expressly waives such instruction. (See FORECITE National™ 17.1.7 [Courtroom Security: Request Or Sua Sponted].)

RESEARCH NOTES:

See also Benchbook For U.S. District Court Judges [2.05.3 Jury Selection-Criminal: Anonymous Juries].

See also Benchbook For U.S. District Court Judges [2.06 Standard Voir Dire Questions-Criminal].

See also generally, FORECITE National™ 305.10.1 [Juror Anonymity].

See also generally, FORECITE National™ 305.16.5 [Physical Restraints, Courtroom Security, Disruption, Etc.].

SAMPLE INSTRUCTION # 1 [Matter Of Procedure] [To Protect From Media Intrusion]:

[As a matter of procedure] [to protect you from unwarranted intrusions from the media] you will be referred to by your juror identification number rather than your name during the trial.

You may not consider the use of this procedure for any purpose or draw any inferences from it at all. Do not consider it as evidence of anything and do not permit it to enter into your view of the evidence or your later deliberations. Such procedures should have no bearing on your determination of whether or not the defendant has been proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

SAMPLE INSTRUCTION # 2 [Customary Practice]:

Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you will be referred to by number rather than name during this trial. This is a customary practice that has nothing to do with the defendant. Therefore, you can see that it would be very unfair for you to somehow hold this procedure against the defendant, when it has nothing to do with [him] [her] at all. As a result, I instruct you that you may not consider the use of numbers rather than names at all. Do not consider it as evidence of anything and do not permit it to enter into your view of the evidence or your later deliberations.

SAMPLE INSTRUCTION # 3 [Anonymity as "Experiment"]:

Now, there are certain additional comments concerning the manner in which you have been selected and the manner in which you are going to be treated throughout this trial. You understand that you will be sequestered. This is not at all unusual. In any case involving a high degree of publicity or a case which is expected to attract a high degree of publicity, we like to keep jurors to themselves and to see to it they do not hear anything on the radio or television about the case. We want and both sides want to make sure when the time comes your verdict is based upon what you hear in the courtroom and not on what somebody may have said in the newspapers.

This case is a little different from most in that, as you know, you have been selected on an anonymous basis. This is a sort of experimental procedure that we are trying in this case; and the reasons for it, I want to make clear, do not have anything to do with whether or not the defendant is guilty. That question is something which you as jurors must decide on the basis of the evidence which has been presented.

[Adapted from instruction given in U.S. v. Scarfo (E.D. Pa. 1987)1987 WL 14505.]

SAMPLE INSTRUCTION # 4:

    As in all cases, the judge has to try to provide a fair trial to both sides; and I have to touch all bases. If this were a civil case where the plaintiff was suing the defendant for damages, I would be required to instruct the jury on how they calculate damages even though I don't know whether they are going to decide in favor of the plaintiff or not. So that I have to take into account all possibilities, and that applies also in deciding how the case should be run.

    I am aware, from what has been stated by government counsel in its pleadings and pretrial presentations and so forth, of the general nature of the evidence which the government will present. It is not up to me to decide--and I have not decided and I express no opinion--as to whether that evidence is true or not true. That is the issue which you as jurors will be required to decide.

    But it is conceivable that you will decide that the government's evidence is correct. And if so, then the nature of that evidence is such that you might be apprehensive of the possibility of repercussions or anything of that sort, and that somebody might try to interfere with your performance as a juror, or that they might try to interfere with your family, or you might be apprehensive that they would.

    There will be a lot of testimony--whether you accept it or not is up to you--but there will be a lot of testimony concerning organized crime and the activities of people in organized crime. We want to make sure that you are able to reach your verdict in this case without having to concern yourselves about the possibility of any harm or other improper influence on yourself or members of your family.

    I want to emphasize very strongly that this in no way suggests that the defendant would ever have dreamed of interfering with you or your family. I have been a judge now for 27 years, and in all that time I have never heard of a case where any defendant ever tried to cause harm to a juror or a member of the juror's family. But we all watch television. We all read newspapers. We see the Godfather movies. We know the atmosphere which is sometimes portrayed on television and in movies and newspapers. And I wanted to make sure that no member of the jury would worry about it, even though it is my personal, strong belief that there would never have been any basis for any worry or concern even if you accept the government's evidence as correct. And, as I say, that is something which is up to you and not something which I have decided.

    And from the defendant's standpoint, he does not want to be in a position where somebody, in order to cause him harm, might pretend to be representing him and causing threats to the jury. Similarly, he does not want to be exposed to the possibility that some unscrupulous government agent or somebody who thinks they are helping the government might try to create some impression on the part of the jury that the defendant is bringing pressure on them.

[Given in U.S. v. Scarfo (3rd Cir. 1988) 850 F2d 1015, 1027.]

SAMPLE INSTRUCTION # 5:

    In any high-profile case, we are all subject to crank phone calls and anonymous letters and that sort of thing. We want to protect the defendant as well as the government from any belief on the part of the jury that these communications are coming from the other side. In other words, we don't want the defendant to be characterized as somebody who would be sending anonymous communications to the jury; and we don't want the government to be characterized as somebody who is trying to influence the jury improperly.

    To make a long story short, this is done in order to provide laboratory conditions so that both sides will get a fair trial. It is most emphatically not being done because of any apprehension on the part of the court that you would have been endangered or subject to improper pressures if your names had been disclosed. Your names have not been disclosed to either side, and that is the way we are going to keep it, just to be sure that there is no suggestion on anybody's part of anything improper from either side. . . I want to make sure that you understand the fact that you are anonymously selected and are being sequestered is not in any way a reflection upon the defendant or the defense or anybody associated with the defense. It is simply a precautionary measure to make sure that both sides get a fair trial.

    I just want to make sure you understand that nothing having to do with your being sequestered has any bearing on the case so far as your verdict in choosing which of the competing arguments to accept.

    The reason that you have been kept anonymous, as I stated earlier, is simply because in view of the nature of some of the evidence and of the witnesses who would be testifying, we wanted to make sure that you would not have any apprehensions about your safety or the safety of your families or anything else. I repeat what I said earlier, that I can assure you absolutely that there was never the slightest reality to any such feeling of insecurity. In other words, there was never any consideration by this court in deciding that you should be anonymous, that any of the parties to this action would have done anything or caused you any problems.

    We simply wanted to protect you against the possibility that others not associated with the trial might have tried to muddy up the waters, might have tried to cause unnecessary worry, and primarily because we wanted to relieve your minds of any anxiety, even though so far as I am concerned, there would never have been any cause for any genuine anxiety. We wanted to be sure that you would be able to act absolutely free of any such worries.

    And as I told you at the beginning, and I will repeat now, the fact that you have been sequestered and have been kept anonymous does not represent any expression of opinion on the part of the court as to the validity or accuracy of any of the testimony which has been presented. This does not represent a decision that in fact these witnesses for the government are telling the truth, nor, of course, does it state a contrary position. It is simply a totally neutral decision so far as you are concerned.

[Given in U.S. v. Scarfo (E.D. Pa. 1987) 1987 WL 14505.]

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17.4.4 Limiting Admonition May Not Cure Improper Juror Anonymity

PRACTICE NOTE: Although it is generally assumed that the jury will follow the court's admonitions (see Greer v. Miller (1987) 483 US 756, 767 [107 SCt 3102; 97 LEd2d 618]; People v. Arias (CA 1996) 13 C4th 92, 148 [51 CR2d 770]), this presumption is "rooted less in the absolute certitude that the presumption is true than in the belief that it represents a reasonable practical accommodation ...." (Richardson v. Marsh (1987) 481 US 200, 208 [107 SCt 1702; 95 LEd2d 176].) In point of fact the "benefit of a cautionary instruction is 'debatable' in that it may tend to highlight the fact it was intended to minimize." (People v. Frierson (CA 1991) 53 C3d 730, 744 [280 CR 440]; see also People v. Melton (CA 1988) 44 C3d 713, 757-58 [244 CR 867] [no sua sponte duty to instruct the jury to not draw an adverse inference from a defendant's failure to testify]; see also FORECITE National™ 297.3.2 [Cautionary Or Limiting Instructions May Emphasize The Prejudicial Matter].)

It is one thing to presume that cautionary instructions will cure prejudice from security procedures which have been shown to be necessary due to the defendant's own conduct. (See e.g., Arias, 13 C4th at 148 [defendant's courtroom outbursts].) Normally in such cases the necessity of the situation justifies requiring the defendant to rely on the "debatable" utility of a limiting instruction.

However, it is quite another thing to unnecessarily expose the defendant to a potentially prejudicial procedure without any showing that the defendant's conduct necessitated the procedure. In such a situation it is an unfair abridgement of the defendant's rights to a fair trial and due process to require the defense to rely upon a limiting instruction to protect against an inherently prejudicial procedure which has not been shown to be necessary under the circumstances. (See Illinois v. Allen (1970) 397 US 337 [90 SCt 1057; 25 LEd2d 353]; People v. Duran (CA 1976) 16 C3d 282, 292 [127 CR 618].)

CAVEAT: The decision whether to request such an instruction requires careful evaluation as to whether it will unduly emphasize the factor sought to be limited. (See "CAVEAT" to FORECITE National™ 17.2.2.1 [Instruction That Shackling Is Routine Practice Not Related To Defendant].) Consideration should also be given to the impact of the cautionary instruction on the potential constitutional challenge on appeal. Whether requested or not, counsel should consider emphasizing the inadequacy of a limiting instruction due to the danger it will highlight the prejudice.

RESEARCH NOTES:

See also Benchbook For U.S. District Court Judges [2.05.3 Jury Selection-Criminal: Anonymous Juries].

See also Benchbook For U.S. District Court Judges [2.06 Standard Voir Dire Questions-Criminal].

See also generally, FORECITE National™ 305.10.1 [Juror Anonymity].

See also generally, FORECITE National™ 305.16.5 [Physical Restraints, Courtroom Security, Disruption, Etc.].

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17.4.5 Jury Anonymity Does Not Represent The Court’s Opinion

RATIONALE: As with other security measures, the jury may conclude that the court’s decision to keep the jurors’ names secret reflects the court’s opinion that the defendant is guilty.

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES: See FORECITE National™ 17.1.2 [Courtroom Security: Sources Of Prejudice To The Defendant].

FEDERALIZATION: To federalize this request, click here. [Constitutional Macro 2.2; 7.5; 10.1].

RESEARCH NOTES:

See also Benchbook For U.S. District Court Judges [2.05.3 Jury Selection-Criminal: Anonymous Juries].

See also Benchbook For U.S. District Court Judges [2.06 Standard Voir Dire Questions-Criminal].

See also generally, FORECITE National™ 305.10.1 [Juror Anonymity].

See also generally, FORECITE National™ 305.16.5 [Physical Restraints, Courtroom Security, Disruption, Etc.].

SAMPLE INSTRUCTION:

And as I told you at the beginning, and I will repeat now, the fact that you have been sequestered and have been kept anonymous does not represent any expression of opinion on the part of the court as to the validity or accuracy of any of the testimony which has been presented. This does not represent a decision that in fact these witnesses for the government are telling the truth, nor, of course, does it state a contrary position. It is simply a totally neutral decision so far as you are concerned.

[Given in U.S. v. Scarfo (E.D. Pa. 1987) 1987 WL 14505.]

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17.4.6 Juror Anonymity: Presence Of Counsel When Deciding

PRACTICE NOTE: See U.S. v. Smith (7th Cir. 1994) 31 F3d 469, 471-72 [judge’s communication with jury concerning their fear that their addresses were known to the defense involved a fundamental issue and failure to have counsel present was reversible error].

RESEARCH NOTES:

See also Benchbook For U.S. District Court Judges [2.05.3 Jury Selection-Criminal: Anonymous Juries].

See also Benchbook For U.S. District Court Judges [2.06 Standard Voir Dire Questions-Criminal].

See also generally, FORECITE National™ 305.10.1 [Juror Anonymity].

See also generally, FORECITE National™ 305.16.5 [Physical Restraints, Courtroom Security, Disruption, Etc.].

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17.4.7 Juror Anonymity: Request For More Extensive Voir Dire

PRACTICE NOTE: If the court impanels an anonymous jury counsel may ask for more extensive voir dire and juror questionnaires to overcome the anonymity limitation. (See U.S. v. Barnes (2nd Cir. 1979) 604 F2d 121, 137; U.S. v. Edmond (DC Cir. 1995) 52 F3d 1080, 1092.)

RESEARCH NOTES:

See Hollander & Bergman, Everytrial Criminal Defense Resource Book (West, 1999) § 1:9, p. 1-19.

See Capital Punishment Handbook [2.6.1.1 a. Individual Voir Dire: Authorities].

See also Benchbook For U.S. District Court Judges [2.05.3 Jury Selection-Criminal: Anonymous Juries].

See also Benchbook For U.S. District Court Judges [2.06 Standard Voir Dire Questions-Criminal].

See also generally, FORECITE National™ 305.10.1 [Juror Anonymity].

See also generally, FORECITE National™ 305.16.5 [Physical Restraints, Courtroom Security, Disruption, Etc.].