Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and its progeny govern the admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation in both state and federal courts. Miranda is a constitutional decision that may not be overruled by an Act of Congress, which was the intent of section 3501, Title 18 of the U.S. Code.

If the issue of voluntariness of a confession is raised during trial, the court must hold a hearing out of the presence of the jury to determine whether the confession is admissible.

Despite the failure of defense counsel to offer an objection, if during the course of a trial the trial judge finds that the voluntariness of a confession is clearly in doubt, he or she must conduct an inquiry on that issue.

The standard for determining the voluntariness of a confession is whether, taking into consideration all the circumstances, the statement is the product of the accused’s free and rational choice. The confession must not have been extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, or the exertion of any improper influence.

To find a defendant’s confession voluntary, the court must conclude that the defendant made an independent and informed choice of his or her own free will, that the defendant possessed the capability to do so, and that the defendant’s will was not overborne by surrounding pressures and circumstances.

The voluntariness of a confession cannot be equated with the absolute absence of intimidation. Under such a test, virtually no statement would be voluntary because few people give incriminating statements in the absence of official action of some kind.

Statements or confessions made during a time of mental incompetency or insanity are involuntary and inadmissible.

The government is required to prove the voluntariness of a confession only by a preponderance of the evidence.

To determine the voluntariness of a confession, the court must consider the effect that the totality of the circumstances had on the will of the defendant.  The question in each case is whether the defendant’s will was overborne when he or she confessed.

Subsequent administration of Miranda warnings to a suspect who has previously given a voluntary but unwarned statement is sufficient to allow admission of the statement.

Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985)
Cf. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986) (the police’s failure to inform the suspect of attorney’s phone call did not fatally taint his waivers of his Fifth Amendment rights)

A defendant who has been charged with an offense and is represented by counsel may be questioned by police regarding a different, related offense without counsel present. A confession made in such circumstances, with adequate Miranda warnings, is admissible.

Independent of the question of voluntariness, a defendant’s case may turn on his or her ability to convince the jury that the manner in which his or her confession was obtained casts doubt on its credibility. Thus, at trial a defendant must be allowed to introduce evidence of the circumstances under which the confession was made, even if the defendant marshaled the same evidence earlier in support of an unsuccessful motion to suppress.

Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986)
But see Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37 (1996) (Crane does not set forth an absolute entitlement to introduce crucial, relevant evidence)

Part V(A) 10b    Admissibility: Confessions By Defendant: Burden On Prosecution To Prove Voluntariness Of Confession

The prosecution bears the burden of convincing the court by at least a preponderance of the evidence that the confession was voluntary.

Part V(A) 10c    Admissibility: Confessions By Defendant: Court Is Not To Consider Truthfulness Of Confession

The court is to disregard the question whether the defendant in fact spoke the truth in making a confession. During the hearing, the trial judge is to ignore implications of reliability and to shut his or her mind to any internal evidence of authenticity that a confession might bear. The only question before the court is whether the confession was given knowingly and voluntarily.

Doby v. South Carolina Dept. of Corrections, 741 F.2d 76 (4th Cir. 1984) (habeas corpus proceeding)
Doby v. South Carolina Dept. of Corrections, 802 F.2d 718 (4th Cir. 1986)

Part V(A) 10d    Admissibility: Confessions By Defendant: Court To Make Affirmative Finding Of Voluntariness

When an evidentiary hearing has been held on a motion to suppress a confession, the trial court should make a finding on the record as to the voluntariness of the confession.

Part V(A) 10e    Admissibility: Confessions By Defendant: Court To Instruct Jury

If the issue of the voluntariness of a confession has been placed before the jury, the court must provide a specific instruction on voluntariness to the jury. The court must instruct the jury to give such weight to the confession as the jury feels that it deserves under all the circumstances.

United States v. McLernon, 746 F.2d 1098 (6th Cir. 1984)

The trial court is required to instruct the jury concerning the weight to be given a defendant’s confession only if sufficient relevant evidence was presented to raise a genuine factual issue concerning the voluntariness of the confession.

United States v. Fera, 616 F.2d 590 (1st Cir. 1980)
United States v. Bondurant, 689 F.2d 1246 (5th Cir. 1982)
United States v. Blue Horse, 856 F.2d 1037 (8th Cir. 1988)