NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK - 2006
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Chapter 2: Capital Punishment Handbook: Pre-Trial And Preliminary Stage Issues

        2.4  Competency To Stand Trial

As established in Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam), a defendant is not competent to stand trial if he or she lacks “sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding–and a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” In Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437 (1992), the Supreme Court held that a state may legislate the presumption that defendants are competent to stand trial and require defendants to bear the burden of proving that they are not. In Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348 (1996), the Supreme Court further clarified that a state may not set the standard for such proof at “clear and convincing evidence.” The Court stated that such a rule allows the state to try a defendant who is “more likely than not” incompetent to stand trial and thus violates due process.

Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348 (1996) (holding Oklahoma’s procedural rule requiring defendant to prove incompetency to stand trial by “clear and convincing evidence” is too onerous a burden and violates due process).

Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437 (1992) (holding due process clause permits state to require that a defendant claiming incompetence to stand trial bear burden of proving so by preponderance of evidence).

Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam) (stating defendant is incompetent to stand trial if he lacks “sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding–and a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him”).

Deere v. Woodford , 339 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding in capital case in which the AEDPA did not apply that petitioner was entitled to an evidentiary hearing because he presented sufficient facts, including the post-plea declarations of a psychologist and a psychiatrist, to create a real and substantial doubt as to his competency to stand trial at the time he entered guilty plea), as amended on denial of rehearing.

Odle v. Woodford, 534 U.S. 888 (9th Cir.) (holding trial court erred in failing to conduct competency hearing, notwithstanding that no one questioned petitioner’s competency over the course of two years of pretrial proceedings and a month-long trial, where record showed petitioner had suffered from massive head trauma, was missing part of his brain and exhibited psychotic behavior; instructing state to either hold retroactive competency hearing or set aside capital conviction), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 888 (2001).

Amaya-Ruiz v. Stewart, 121 F.3d 486 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that due process requires a state trial court to sua sponte inquire into defendant’s competency if a reasonable judge would have a bona fide doubt as to defendant’s competency), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1130 (1998).

Miles v. Stainer, 108 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding, in a noncapital case, that standard of competency to plead guilty is equivalent to that needed to stand trial).

Moran v. Godinez, 57 F.3d 690, 695 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating trial court must hold hearing before allowing defendant to waive constitutional rights if court doubts defendant’s competency), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 976 (1995).

Hernandez v. Ylst, 930 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1991) (articulating standard for incompetency to stand trial).