NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK - 2006
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Chapter 1: Capital Punishment Handbook: Constitutionality And Other General Considerations

        1.2 Mandatory Death Sentences

After the Furman decision in 1972, several states chose one of two methods to amend their death penalty statutes to avoid the “arbitrary and capricious” pitfalls of the unguided discretion procedures invalidated by Furman. One method (now universally accepted by those states that have the death penalty) provided guidance to the sentencing body regarding the factors it should consider in imposing the death penalty. The Court upheld this approach in 1976 in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976), and Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). The other method removed all discretion by providing for mandatory death sentences upon conviction for certain offenses. On the same day that it decided Gregg, Proffitt, and Jurek, the Supreme Court decided Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976), and Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976), holding the mandatory method unconstitutional. The Court determined that the Eighth Amendment proscription of cruel and unusual punishment requires heightened reliability in death cases and that this in turn requires that each defendant be evaluated individually to determine whether the death penalty is an appropriate punishment for the particular crime.

In these 1976 opinions, the Court noted one potential exception to the ban on mandatory death sentences: defendants who committed murder while serving a previously imposed life sentence. In 1987, however, the Court decided Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66 (1987), eliminating even this potential exception to mandatory death penalties. The Court held that an individualized sentencing determination is required in each capital case, and therefore a mandatory death penalty even for murders committed by inmates serving life sentences without possibility of parole was unconstitutional.

Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990) (upholding Arizona statute mandating that court “shall” impose death penalty if it finds one or more aggravating circumstances and finds mitigating circumstances insufficient for leniency, because statute does not preclude consideration of mitigation, nor create presumption of death). 

Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370 (1990) (upholding, based on Blystone, now changed California jury instruction mandating that jury “shall” impose death sentence if it finds aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating).

Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299 (1990) (upholding Pennsylvania statute mandating death sentence if jury finds at least one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances or finds aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances, because consideration of mitigation satisfies constitutional individualized sentencing requirement).

Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66 (1987) (holding now repealed Nevada mandatory death penalty statute unconstitutional, even as applied to life prisoner convicted of murdering fellow prisoner, because statute does not provide constitutionally required individualized sentencing).

Baldwin v. Alabama, 472 U.S. 372 (1985) (upholding now-repealed Alabama statute requiring jury, when convicting defendant of any of specified aggravated crimes, to impose death sentence, but requiring judge, notwithstanding jury “sentence,” to weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances in sentencing death or life imprisonment).

Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 (1977) (holding Louisiana statute specifying killing of on-duty police officer as one of five mandatory death penalty homicides unconstitutional because no consideration of mitigating factors).

Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (holding Louisiana mandatory death penalty statute, restricting death penalty eligibility to five homicide categories and jury finding of intent, unconstitutional for same reasons North Carolina statute unconstitutional in Woodson).

Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (holding North Carolina mandatory death penalty statute unconstitutional because statute contrary to contemporary standards regarding mandatory death penalty, lack of jury standards satisfying Furman, and failure to consider individual offender and offense).

Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 674–75 (9th Cir.) (upholding Washington statute providing death sentence where jury finds beyond reasonable doubt insufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency, because allows sentencer to consider any mitigating factors), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1119 (1994).

Creech v. Arave, 947 F.2d 873, 886 (9th Cir. 1991) (upholding Idaho statute mandating that court “shall” sentence death upon finding an aggravating circumstance “unless” it finds outweighing mitigating circumstances because satisfies individualized sentencing requirement by allowing consideration of all relevant mitigation), rev’d on other grounds, 507 U.S. 463 (1993).

Peter G. Barber, Note, People v. Smith: Mandatory Death Laid to Rest, 49 Alb. L. Rev. 926 (1985) (analyzing, prior to Sumner, New York Court of Appeals case striking down mandatory death penalty applied to life-term inmate convicted of murder, reviewing New York history of death penalty, and analyzing U.S. Supreme Court and New York Court of Appeals decisions regarding mandatory death penalty).

Jocelyn March Dreier, The Pennsylvania Death Penalty, Which Mandates a Sentence of Death Upon a Finding of One Statutory Aggravating Circumstance and No Mitigating Circumstance, Does Not Violate the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 68 U. Det. L. Rev. 565 (1991) (discussing Blystone).

David S. Frankel, Note, The Constitutionality of the Mandatory Death Penalty for Life-Term Prisoners Who Murder, 55 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 636 (1980) (analyzing, prior to Sumner, constitutionality of mandatory death penalty for life-term prisoners convicted of murder, focusing on Alabama case, Harris v. State).

Andrea Galbo, Note, Death After Life: The Future of New York’s Mandatory Death Penalty For Murders Committed by Life-Term Prisoners, 13 Fordham Urb. L.J. 597 (1985) (analyzing, prior to Sumner, constitutionality of mandatory death penalty for life-term prisoners convicted of murder, focusing on New York statute and recent Court of Appeals decision, People v. Smith).

Daniel R. Harris, Note, Capital Sentencing After Walton v. Arizona: A Retreat from the “Death is Different” Doctrine, 40 Am. U. L. Rev. 1389, 1394-1403 (1991) (summarizing Furman and its progeny, and proposing that Walton represents a departure from that precedent).

Philip E. Mackey, The Inutility of Mandatory Capital Punishment: An Historical Note, 54 B.U. L. Rev. 32 (1974) (summarizing American nineteenth century opinions of mandatory death penalty, focusing on consequences of jury reluctance to sentence death).

John W. Poulos, The Supreme Court, Capital Punishment and the Substantive Criminal Law: The Rise and Fall of Mandatory Capital Punishment, 28 Ariz. L. Rev. 143 (1986) (reviewing history of capital jurisprudence up to Furman, and analyzing legislative response of mandatory statutes, and 1976 Supreme Court cases invalidating them).