7^th CIRCUIT FEDERAL INSTRUCTIONS 1999
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7^th CIRCUIT FEDERAL INSTRUCTIONS 1999

FORECITE National™ Materials Related To This Instruction:

See FORECITE National™ Federal Models By Offense: Conspiracy To Defraud The Government With Respect To Claims – Elements (18 USC 286)

To sustain the charge of conspiracy to defraud the government with respect to claims, the government must prove the following propositions:

First, the defendant entered into a conspiracy to obtain [payment; allowance; aid in obtaining payment; aid in obtaining allowance] of a claim against [the United States" a department or agency of the United States];

Section 286 does not require proof of an overt act. United States v. Sassi, 966 F.2d 283, 284 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 991 (1992); United States v. Umentum, 547 F.2d 987, 989-91 (7th Cir.1976). All that is required is proof of an agreement between two or more persons to commit an offense under § 286. United States v. Cova, 755 F.2d 595 (7th Cir.1985); United States v. Cortwright, 528 F.2d 168 (7th Cir.1975). See also United States v. Morado, 454 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 917 (1972).

7^th CIRCUIT FEDERAL INSTRUCTIONS 1999

FORECITE National™ Materials Related To This Instruction:

See FORECITE National™ Federal Models By Offense: False Claims Against The Government (18 USC 287)

To sustain the charge of making a false claim, the government must prove the following propositions:

First, that the defendant [made, presented] a claim against [the United States, a department or agency of the United States];

Second, that the claim was [false, fictitious, fraudulent];

Third, that the defendant knew the claim was [false, fictitious, fraudulent];

[Fourth, that the defendant acted with the intent to defraud.]

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant guilty.

If, on the other hand, you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any one of these propositions has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant not guilty.

Although the pattern instruction requires proof of intent to defraud, the issue remains unresolved in this Circuit. Most recently, in United States v. Catton, ___ F.3d ____ (7th Cir.1996), the Court opined in dicta that an intent to defraud is implicit when one knowingly files a false claim. For that reason, the Court concluded, again in dicta, that a willfulness instruction is not required under § 287 (although one was given in Catton). In support, the Court cited United States v. Ferguson, 793 F.2d 828, cert. denied, 477 U.S. 933 (1986), which held that the government need not prove willfulness in a false claims case. Although the issue of intent to defraud was not raised in Ferguson, the Court did cite to United States v. Blecker, 657 F.2d 629, 654 (4th Cir.1981), for the proposition that § 287 does not require a showing of specific intent to defraud the government.

Further complicating the issues are the Court’s decisions in United States v. Nazon, 940 F.2d 255 (7th Cir.1991) and United States v. Haddon, 927 F.2d 942, 951 (7th Cir.1991). In Nazon, the jury was instructed that it must find that the defendant submitted his claim with an intent to defraud. On appeal, the defendant objected to the district court’s failure to define the phrase intent to defraud for the jury. Although the Seventh Circuit held that the failure to define intent to defraud was not plain error, it assumed that the jury was required to find intent to defraud. In Haddon, the Court explicitly endorsed an instruction requiring the government to prove intent to defraud on a § 287 count.

In November of 1997, in Bates v. United States., 118 S.Ct. 285 (1997), the Supreme Court declined to read an intent to defraud into 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1097(a), which statute prohibits the knowing and willful misapplication of student loan funds. In refusing to read the intent element into the statute, the Court did not lay down a blanket rule. Instead, it considered a number of factors, including the plain language of the statute, the fact that other subsections of the same statute included the intent to defraud language, and the history of the statute.

The Seventh Circuit has not yet determined whether intent to defraud should be read into Sec. 287 in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Bates. The key to the analysis will be whether there is an historical basis for requiring an intent to defraud. This analysis is particularly suited to the adversary process. See, for example, the Seventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. Bates, 852 F.2d 212 (7th Cir.1988), where the court held in a case unrelated to the more recent Supreme Court case of the same name, that an intent to defraud requirement should be read into 18 U.S.C. Sec. 656, prohibiting the willful misapplication of bank funds and its decision in United States v. Ranum, 96 F.3d 1020 (1996) (predating the Supreme Court’s decision in Bates) where the court held that an intent to defraud requirement should not be read into 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1097(a), prohibiting the making of false statements to obtain student loan funds.

Because this question is an interpretive question of first impression, the Committee believes it is more appropriate to leave to the court the initial determination of whether intent to defraud is an element in Sec. 287.

If intent to defraud is an element, the court should add the bracketed language.

A separate unresolved question exists as to whether the government must prove that the defendant knew the false claim would be presented to the United States or whether that point is a jurisdictional fact which need not be presented to the jury. The case law is surprisingly silent. The issue turns on whether the requirement is more like the requirement in United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 464 (1994)(proof that a defendant knowingly transported visual depictions of minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct in violation of 18 USC 2252 requires proof that defendant knew depiction was of a minor) or more like United States v. Feola, 95 S. Ct. 1255 (1975) (proof that a defendant conspired to assault a federal officer in violation of 18 USC 111 does not require proof that defendant knew person was federal officer).

7^th CIRCUIT FEDERAL INSTRUCTIONS 1999

FORECITE National™ Materials Related To This Instruction:

See FORECITE National™ Federal Models By Offense: False Claims Against The Government (18 USC 287)

See United States v. Precision Medical Laboratories, Inc., 593 F.2d 434, 442-443 (2d Cir.1978); United States v. Catena, 500 F.2d 1319 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1047 (1974). See generally 18 USC 2(b). See also United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1949) (interpreting R.S. § 5438, forerunner of 18 USC 287); United States v. Beasley, 550 F.2d 261 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 938 (1977).

7^th CIRCUIT FEDERAL INSTRUCTIONS 1999

FORECITE National™ Materials Related To This Instruction:

See FORECITE National™ Federal Models By Offense: Criminal Contempt (18 USC 401)

Because of the paucity of jury trials brought under the statute, no pattern instruction is proposed.

The Committee has not drafted an instruction for § 401 because so few jury trials occur under it. This is because judges may decide in advance of trial whether, upon conviction, they will impose a sentence of six months or less. Where the sentence to be imposed is less than six months, a jury trial is not required. See generally Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 148-150 (1969) ("Congress, perhaps in recognition of the scope of criminal contempt, has authorized courts to impose penalties but has not placed any specific limits on their discretion; it has not categorized contempts as ‘serious’ or ‘petty.’ 18 USC § 401, 402. Accordingly, this Court has held that in prosecutions for criminal contempt where no maximum penalty is authorized, the severity of the penalty actually imposed is the best indication of the seriousness of the particular offense. [Footnotes omitted])"; Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 198 (1968)("criminal contempt is a petty offense unless the punishment makes it a serious one"); Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 380 (1966); United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 352 (7th Cir.1972) ("If the penalty actually imposed [for criminal contempt] exceeds six months’ imprisonment, the maximum sentence for a ‘petty offense’ under 18 USC 1, the contempt is serious, and a jury trial must be afforded")(citing Frank at 151, Cheff at 379-80).

For information about the elements required for conviction under 18 USC 401(1), see United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345 (7th Cir.1972); for 18 USC 401(3), see In re Betts, 927 F.2d 983, 986 (7th Cir.1991), rev'd on other grounds, Betts v. United States, 10 F.3d 1278 (7th Cir. 1993). For general information regarding 18 U.S.C. 401(2), see Cammer v. United States, 350 U.S. 399, 405-06 (1956).

7^th CIRCUIT FEDERAL INSTRUCTIONS 1999

FORECITE National™ Materials Related To This Instruction:

See FORECITE National™ Federal Models By Offense: Criminal Contempt (18 USC 402)

Because of the paucity of jury trials brought under the statute, no pattern instruction is proposed.

Although a jury trial is mandated for § 402 offenses (when the act or omission giving rise to the contempt charge also is itself a criminal offense) under 18 USC 3691, the exceptions enumerated in § 3691 have the practical effect of sharply limiting the number of jury trials under § 402. The Committee therefore believes that an instruction for § 402 is unnecessary.

For judicial interpretation of 18 USC § 402 and 3691, see United States v. Pyle, 518 F. Supp. 139, 145-56 (E.D. Pa. 1981), aff'd, 722 F.2d 736 (3d Cir. 1983); United States v. Wright, 516 F. Supp. 1113 (E.D. Pa. 1981).

7^th CIRCUIT FEDERAL INSTRUCTIONS 1999

FORECITE National™ Materials Related To This Instruction:

See FORECITE National™ Federal Models By Offense: Counterfeiting (18 USC 471)

To sustain the charge of [making, forging, counterfeiting, altering] a (specific security or obligation involved), the government must prove the following propositions:

First, that the defendant [falsely made, forged, counterfeited, altered] a (specify security or obligation involved); and

Second, that the defendant did so with the intent to defraud.

I instruct you as a matter of law that a (specific security or obligation involved) is an obligation or other security of the United States.

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that both of these propositions have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant guilty.

If, on the other hand, you find from your consideration of all the evidence that either of these propositions has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant not guilty.

Whether a specific security or obligation is an obligation or security of the United States is a question of law and is to be decided by the trial court. See 18 USC 8; United States v. Anzalone, 626 F.2d 239 (2d Cir.1980).

7^th CIRCUIT FEDERAL INSTRUCTIONS 1999

FORECITE National™ Materials Related To This Instruction:

See FORECITE National™ Federal Models By Offense: Passing Counterfeit Securities Or Obligations (18 USC 472)

To sustain the charge of [passing, uttering, publishing, selling, bringing into the United States, possessing, concealing] [falsely made, forged, counterfeited, altered] (specific security or obligation involved), the government must prove the following propositions:

First, that the defendant [passed, uttered, published, sold, brought into the United States, possessed, concealed] [falsely made, forged, counterfeited, altered] (specific security or obligation involved);

Second, that the defendant knew at the time that the (specific security or obligation involved) was [falsely made, forged, counterfeited, altered]; and Third, that the defendant did so with the intent to defraud.

I instruct you as a matter of law that a (specific security or obligation involved) is an obligation or other security of the United States.

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant guilty.

If, on the other hand, you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any one of these propositions has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant not guilty.

Section 472 includes attempting to pass, utter, publish, or sell counterfeit obligations. When attempt is charged, general instruction ___, which defines attempt, should be given.

Whether a specific security or obligation is an obligation or security of the United States is a question of law and is to be decided by the trial court. See 18 USC 8; United States v. Anzalone, 626 F.2d 239 (2d Cir.1980).

7^th CIRCUIT FEDERAL INSTRUCTIONS 1999

FORECITE National™ Materials Related To This Instruction:

See FORECITE National™ Federal Models By Offense: Dealing In Counterfeit Obligations Or Securities--Elements (18 USC 473)

To sustain the charge of [buying, selling, exchanging, transferring, receiving, delivering] [false, forged, counterfeited, altered] (specific security or obligation), the government must prove the following propositions:

First, that the defendant [bought, sold, exchanged, transferred, received, delivered] [false, forged, counterfeited, altered] (specific security or obligation);

Second, that the defendant knew at the time that the (specific security or obligation) was [false, forged, counterfeit, altered]; and

Third, that the defendant did so with the intent that the (specific security or obligation) be [passed, published, used] as true and genuine.

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant guilty.

If, on the other hand, you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any one of these propositions has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant not guilty.

7^th CIRCUIT FEDERAL INSTRUCTIONS 1999

[041] Plates or Stones for Counterfeiting Obligations or Securities

(18 USC 474)

FORECITE National™ Materials Related To This Instruction:

See FORECITE National™ Federal Models By Offense: Plates Or Stones For Counterfeiting Obligations Or Securities (18 USC 474)

This section does not lend itself to a pattern instruction. Note that all of the sections do not have the same intent requirements. The instructions for sections 472 and 473 may be of assistance in drafting an instruction for this section.

7^th CIRCUIT FEDERAL INSTRUCTIONS 1999

FORECITE National™ Materials Related To This Instruction:

See FORECITE National™ Federal Models By Offense: Forgery (18 USC 495)

See FORECITE National™ Federal Models By Offense: Forgery (Uttering A Forged Endorsement) (18 USC 495 (¶ 2) Or (18 USC 510(a)(2)) (Face Value Of $500 Or More)

In United States v. Bates, 118 S.Ct. 285 (1997), the Supreme Court declined to read a requirement of proof of an intent to defraud into 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1097(a), which statute prohibits the knowing and willful misapplication of student loan funds. In refusing to read the intent element into the statute, the Court did not lay down a blanket rule. Instead, it considered a number of factors, including the plain language of the statute, the fact that other subsections of the same statute included the intent to defraud language, and the history of the statute.

The Seventh Circuit has not yet determined whether an intent to defraud requirement should be read into Sec. 495 in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Bates. The key to the analysis will be whether there is an historical basis for requiring an intent to defraud. This analysis is particularly suited to the adversary process. See, for example, the Seventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. Bates, 852 F.2d 212 (7th Cir. 1988), where the court held, in a case unrelated to the more recent Supreme Court case of the same name, that an intent to defraud requirement should be read into 18 U.S.C. Sec. 656, prohibiting the willful misapplication of bank funds and its decision in United States v. Ranum, 96 F.3d 1020 (7th Cir. 1996) (predating the Supreme Court’s decision in Bates) where the court held that an intent to defraud requirement should not be read into 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1097(a), prohibiting the making of false statements to obtain student loan funds.

Because this question is an interpretive question of first impression, the Committee believes it is more appropriate to leave to the courts the initial determination of whether intent to defraud is an element in Sec. 495.

7^th CIRCUIT FEDERAL INSTRUCTIONS 1999

FORECITE National™ Materials Related To This Instruction:

See FORECITE National™ Federal Models By Offense: Forgery (18 USC 495)

See FORECITE National™ Federal Models By Offense: Forgery (Uttering A Forged Endorsement) (18 USC 495 (¶ 2) Or (18 USC 510(a)(2)) (Face Value Of $500 Or More)

7^th CIRCUIT FEDERAL INSTRUCTIONS 1999

FORECITE National™ Materials Related To This Instruction:

See FORECITE National™ Federal Models By Offense: Forgery (18 USC 495)

To sustain the charge of presenting a false document, the government must prove the following propositions:

First, that the defendant [transmitted, presented] the (document) to (name), who was an officer of the United States;

Second, that the document was [transmitted, presented] in support of or in relation to any account or claim;

Third, that when the defendant [transmitted, presented] the (document), it was [false, forged, counterfeited, altered] in that (specific allegation);

Fourth, that when the defendant [transmitted, presented] the (document), the defendant knew it was [false, forged, counterfeited, altered]; and

Fifth, that when the defendant [transmitted, presented] the (document), he did so with the intent to defraud the United States.

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant guilty.

If, on the other hand, you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any one of these propositions has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant not guilty.

7^th CIRCUIT FEDERAL INSTRUCTIONS 1999

FORECITE National™ Materials Related To This Instruction:

See FORECITE National™ Federal Models By Offense: Falsely Making, Forging, Counterfeiting, Engraving, Or Printing A Money Order – Elements (18 USC 500)

To sustain the charge of (here insert crime), the government must prove the following propositions:

First, that the defendant [falsely made, forged, counterfeited, engraved, printed] a document;

Second, that the document was an imitation of or purported to be a [blank money order, money order issued by or under the direction of the United States Postal Service]; and

Third, that the defendant made the document with the intent to defraud.

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant guilty.

If, on the other hand, you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any one of these propositions has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant not guilty.

7^th CIRCUIT FEDERAL INSTRUCTIONS 1999

FORECITE National™ Materials Related To This Instruction:

See FORECITE National™ Federal Models By Offense: Falsely Making, Forging, Counterfeiting, Engraving, Or Printing A Money Order – Elements (18 USC 500)

This instruction was adapted from the parallel instruction under the mail / wire fraud statutes, 18 USC § 1341 & 1343.

7^th CIRCUIT FEDERAL INSTRUCTIONS 1999

FORECITE National™ Materials Related To This Instruction:

See FORECITE National™ Federal Models By Offense: Falsely Making, Forging, Counterfeiting, Engraving, Or Printing A Money Order – Elements (18 USC 500)

In November of 1997, in Bates v. United states, 522 U.S. 23 (1997)the Supreme Court declined to read a requirement of proof of an intent to defraud into 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1097(a), which statute prohibits the knowing and willful misapplication of student loan funds. In refusing to read the intent element into the statute, the Court did not lay down a blanket rule. Instead, it considered a number of factors, including the plain language of the statute, the fact that other subsections of the same statute included the intent to defraud language, and the history of the statute.

The Seventh Circuit has not yet determined whether an intent to defraud requirement should be read into Sec. 500 in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Bates. The key to the analysis will be whether there is an historical basis for requiring an intent to defraud. This analysis is particularly suited to the adversary process. See, for example, the Seventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. Bates, 852 F.2d 212 (7th Cir.1988), where the court held, in a case unrelated to the more recent Supreme Court case of the same name, that an intent to defraud requirement should be read into 18 U.S.C. Sec. 656, prohibiting the willful misapplication of bank funds and its decision in United States v. Ranum, 96 F.3d 1020 (7th Cir.1996) (predating the Supreme Court’s decision in Bates) where the court held that an intent to defraud requirement should not be read into 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1097(a), prohibiting the making of false statements to obtain student loan funds.

Because this question is an interpretive question of first impression, the Committee believes it is more appropriate to leave to the courts the initial determination of whether intent to defraud is an element in Sec. 500.

If intent to defraud is an element, the court should add the bracketed language.

7^th CIRCUIT FEDERAL INSTRUCTIONS 1999

FORECITE National™ Materials Related To This Instruction:

See FORECITE National™ Federal Models By Offense: Falsely Making, Forging, Counterfeiting, Engraving, Or Printing A Money Order – Elements (18 USC 500)

In United States v. Bates, 118 S.Ct. 285 (1997), the Supreme Court declined to read a requirement of proof of an intent to defraud into 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1097(a), which statute prohibits the knowing and willful misapplication of student loan funds. In refusing to read the intent element into the statute, the Court did not lay down a blanket rule. Instead, it considered a number of factors, including the plain language of the statute, the fact that other subsections of the same statute included the intent to defraud language, and the history of the statute.

The Seventh Circuit has not yet determined whether an intent to defraud requirement should be read into Sec. 500 in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Bates. The key to the analysis will be whether there is an historical basis for requiring an intent to defraud. This analysis is particularly suited to the adversary process. See, for example, the Seventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. Bates, 852 F.2d 212 (7th Cir. 1988), where the court held, in a case unrelated to the more recent Supreme Court case of the same name, that an intent to defraud requirement should be read into 18 U.S.C. Sec. 656, prohibiting the willful misapplication of bank funds and its decision in United States v. Ranum, 96 F.3d 1020 (7th Cir. 1996) (predating the Supreme Court’s decision in Bates) where the court held that an intent to defraud requirement should not be read into 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1097(a), prohibiting the making of false statements to obtain student loan funds.

Because this question is an interpretive question of first impression, the Committee believes it is more appropriate to leave to the courts the initial determination of whether intent to defraud is an element in Sec. 500.

If intent to defraud is an element, the court should add the bracketed language.

7^th CIRCUIT FEDERAL INSTRUCTIONS 1999

FORECITE National™ Materials Related To This Instruction:

See FORECITE National™ Federal Models By Offense: Falsely Making, Forging, Counterfeiting, Engraving, Or Printing A Money Order – Elements (18 USC 500)

To sustain the charge of (here insert crime), the government must prove the following propositions:

First, that the defendant [forged, counterfeited] a material signature or indorsement;

Second, that the signature or indorsement was on a receipt or certificate of identification of a [money order, postal note, blank provided or issued by or under the direction of the (United States Postal Service, post office department, corporation of any foreign country)] which was payable in the United States; and

[Third, that the defendant acted with the intent to defraud.]

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant guilty.

If, on the other hand, you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any one of these propositions has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant not guilty.

In November of 1997, in United States v. Bates, 118 S.Ct. 285 (1997), the Supreme Court declined to read a requirement of proof of an intent to defraud into 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1097(a), which statute prohibits the knowing and willful misapplication of student loan funds. In refusing to read the intent element into the statute, the Court did not lay down a blanket rule. Instead, it considered a number of factors, including the plain language of the statute, the fact that other subsections of the same statute included the intent to defraud language, and the history of the statute.

The Seventh Circuit has not yet determined whether an intent to defraud requirement should be read into Sec. 500 in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Bates. The key to the analysis will be whether there is an historical basis for requiring an intent to defraud. This analysis is particularly suited to the adversary process. See, for example, the Seventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. Bates, 852 F.2d 212 (7th Cir. 1988), where the court held, in a case unrelated to the more recent Supreme Court case of the same name, that an intent to defraud requirement should be read into 18 U.S.C. Sec. 656, prohibiting the willful misapplication of bank funds and its decision in United States v. Ranum, 96 F.3d 1020 (7th Cir. 1996) (predating the Supreme Court’s decision in Bates) where the court held that an intent to defraud requirement should not be read into 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1097(a), prohibiting the making of false statements to obtain student loan funds.

Because this question is an interpretive question of first impression, the Committee believes it is more appropriate to leave to the courts the initial determination of whether intent to defraud is an element in Sec. 500.

If intent to defraud is an element, the court should add the bracketed language.

7^th CIRCUIT FEDERAL INSTRUCTIONS 1999

FORECITE National™ Materials Related To This Instruction:

See FORECITE National™ Federal Models By Offense: Falsely Making, Forging, Counterfeiting, Engraving, Or Printing A Money Order – Elements (18 USC 500)

Third, that the alteration was material.

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant guilty.

If, on the other hand, you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any one of these propositions has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant not guilty.

[NOTE: Choose appropriate terms contained in brackets and parentheses.]

7^th CIRCUIT FEDERAL INSTRUCTIONS 1999

FORECITE National™ Materials Related To This Instruction:

See FORECITE National™ Federal Models By Offense: Falsely Making, Forging, Counterfeiting, Engraving, Or Printing A Money Order – Elements (18 USC 500)

This instruction was adapted from the instruction defining materiality under the false

statement statute, 18 USC 1001.

7^th CIRCUIT FEDERAL INSTRUCTIONS 1999

FORECITE National™ Materials Related To This Instruction:

See FORECITE National™ Federal Models By Offense: Falsely Making, Forging, Counterfeiting, Engraving, Or Printing A Money Order – Elements (18 USC 500)

To sustain the charge of passing, uttering, or publishing forged or altered money orders, the government must prove the following propositions:

First, that the defendant passed or placed in circulation a [money order, postal note];

Second, that when the defendant did so he falsely represented in some way or manner that the [money order, postal note] was genuine;

Third, that when the defendant did so the [money order, postal note] was forged or materially altered;

Fourth, that when the defendant did so, he knew that [any material (initials, signature, stamp impression, indorsement) thereon was (false, forged, counterfeited)] or [a material alteration on the (money order, postal note) was falsely made]; and

Fifth, that the defendant did so with the intent to defraud the United States.

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant guilty.

If, on the other hand, you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any one of these propositions has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant not guilty.

[NOTE: Choose appropriate terms contained in brackets and parentheses.]

7^th CIRCUIT FEDERAL INSTRUCTIONS 1999

FORECITE National™ Materials Related To This Instruction:

See FORECITE National™ Federal Models By Offense: Falsely Making, Forging, Counterfeiting, Engraving, Or Printing A Money Order – Elements (18 USC 500)

To sustain the charge of fraudulently issuing a money order, the government must prove the following propositions:

First, that the defendant issued a money order or postal note without having previously received or paid the full amount of money payable on the order or note;

Second, that the defendant did so for the purpose of [obtaining or receiving money, enabling another person to obtain or receive money] from the United States or its agents or employees; and

Third, that the defendant did so with the intent to defraud the United States.

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant guilty.

If, on the other hand, you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any one of these propositions has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant not guilty.

[NOTE: Choose appropriate term contained in brackets.]

7^th CIRCUIT FEDERAL INSTRUCTIONS 1999

FORECITE National™ Materials Related To This Instruction:

See FORECITE National™ Federal Models By Offense: alsely Making, Forging, Counterfeiting, Engraving, Or Printing A Money Order – Elements (18 USC 500)

To sustain the charge of theft of money orders, the government must prove the following propositions:

First, that the defendant [embezzled, stole, converted to his own use or the use of another, converted or disposed of without authority] a document;

Second, that the defendant did so with the intent to deprive the owner of the use or benefit of the document; and

Third, that the document was a blank money order form provided under the authority of the United States Postal Service.

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that both of these propositions have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant guilty.

If, on the other hand, you find from your consideration of all the evidence that either of these propositions has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant not guilty.

[NOTE: Choose appropriate term contained in brackets.]

7^th CIRCUIT FEDERAL INSTRUCTIONS 1999

FORECITE National™ Materials Related To This Instruction:

See FORECITE National™ Federal Models By Offense: Falsely Making, Forging, Counterfeiting, Engraving, Or Printing A Money Order – Elements (18 USC 500)

To sustain the charge of receipt of stolen money order, the government must prove the following propositions:

7^th CIRCUIT FEDERAL INSTRUCTIONS 1999

FORECITE National™ Materials Related To This Instruction:

See FORECITE National™ Federal Models By Offense: Falsely Making, Forging, Counterfeiting, Engraving, Or Printing A Money Order – Elements (18 USC 500)

7^th CIRCUIT FEDERAL INSTRUCTIONS 1999

See FORECITE National™ Federal Models By Offense: Falsely Making, Forging, Counterfeiting, Engraving, Or Printing A Money Order – Elements (18 USC 500)

When the defendant is charged with stealing the item, this instruction should include only the first two elements.